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An Overview of Loneliness 
Why do I feel lonely? This is a question which has plagued 
human beings for milleniums of time. As we look through all 
recorded history and throughout civilizations past and present, 
we find philosophy, religion, and writings of many types (ori-
ental philosophy, religion, the Bible, the Koran, Greek mytho-
logy, the writings of Shakespeare, Chaucer, and others), seek-
ing to come to grips with this very basic human condition. 
Relatively speaking, the social sciences have undertaken very 
few investigations of loneliness, its causes, and genesis. Of 
the work that has been completed, much appears in self-help 
books and carries a compilation of testimonials from individu-
als who are asserting they have dealt with their loneliness. 
True as this may be, does this thorn in man's side have a dif-
ferent form and content for each person? Though loneliness is 
indeed a very personal phenomenon, are there general societal 
conditions which contribute to the felt loneliness of persons, 
and have these external circumstances magnified the intensity 
of that self-felt loneliness? 
The major concern in the fol lowing discourse is to exp lore 
from a predominantly sociological level what factors have 
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contributed to such pervasive amounts of loneliness that exist 
in our modern world (Gordon, 1976). In the community of Toen-
nies (1957) gemeinshaft, small towns or neighborhoods had sev-
eral strong relationships to affirm their self worth. Daily 
lives were reinforced and networks of contact were created. 
For instance, daily chores meant more than mailing a letter 
and shopping at a store. It was not a burdensome responsibil-
ity as much as it was various social events by which people 
gave one another mutual recognition. The butcher, baker, and 
constable were known as friends. Europe in many areas contin-
ues in this tradi~ion, while America speeds ever ahead for 
efficiency (Gordon, 1976). 
Loneliness, though a feeling common to all human beings, 
fluctuates with social change (Barrett, 1958; Fromm, 1955; 
Hammos, 1952; Laslett, 1960; Mills, 1956; Mumford, 1934; 
Simmel, 1950). What may have been inevitable moments in a per-
son's life can very quickly become a lifestyle for millions 
of people. Mass loneliness is not just a problem that can be 
dealt with by the particular individual involved; it is more 
an indication that things are drastically amiss at the socio-
logical level. When the societal is distinguished from the 
psychological, as noted by Jung (1955), an individual experi-
ence becomes a "collective disturbance." 
Modern Western man does not seem to enjoy nor is able to 
enjoy companionship, support, and protection from his neigh-
bors. This is revealed in a community apathy and ambivalence 
towards the affairs of others. According to Gordon (1976), 
If someone walks out of a house with a TV set, a 
neighbor has no idea if it is the owner taking it to 
the repair shop or a burgler making off with an easy 
haul. You are not likely to enter into a spontane-
ous conversation on the street if you think the per-
son addressing you is a potential mugger. We feel 
like strangers on our own streets. In a circular 
swing more distrust and more loneliness. Where we 
should feel the safest, we rather feel that no one 
would help us if we were in trouble, that what hap-
pens to us, whether good or bad, makes no difference 
to the world around us--that we make no difference 
(p. 19). 
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Many persons have been cut off from primary groups, fami-
ly and kinship networks. Typically they live in an urban or 
suburban area where they meet people not as real persons but 
according to prescribed rules of conduct and modes of behav-
ior. They work their whole lives, it seems, to obtain the new-
est in comfort, convenience and fashion. In a mechanized 
industrial society, persons act primarily as consumers sepa-
rated from direct and personal contact with the mental or manu-
al creation of the consumed products. The lifestyle is one 
which centers on the acquisition of goods and control. Eventu-
ally as society has sought to control power, status, safety, and 
anxiety while maintaining a rationalized evolutionary order, 
Western man has found that he is unable to relate to his own 
nature and others, genuinely or authentically, slipping into 
a dread of nothingness. The inability to relate to nature 
and others has been the consequence of four centuries of devel-
opment and change, where man as the subject has progressively 
increased his separation from the objective world (May, 1958). 
Loneliness, though existent from man's beginnings, was 
once a philosophical problem of concern to poets and 
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philosophers. Judea-Christian religion expresses much of this 
concern in scripture written thousands of years ago (the King 
James Bible). Thomas Wolfe (1935) described loneliness in an 
essay: 
The huge, dark wall of loneliness is around him now 
and he cannot escape. And the cancerous plant of 
memory is feeding at his entrails, recalling hun-
dreds of forgotten faces and ten thousand vanished 
days, until life, until all life seems as strange 
and insubstantial as a dream. Time flows by him 
like a river, and he waits in his little room like 
a creature held captive by an evil spell. And he 
will hear, far off, the murmurous drone of the great 
earth, and feel that he has been forgotten, that his 
powers are wasting from him while the river flows, 
and that his life has come to nothing (p. 159). 
Not only is loneliness a problem for the old or divorced, 
but for men and women in singles bars, in encounter groups, 
adolescents running away from home or refusing to go to school, 
corporate executives, military personnel who move every few 
years, and others who keep crisis hot lines busy twenty-four 
hours daily. 
Though loneliness knows no special class, rac~ or age of 
people that it affects, there are trends in the type of per-
sons who are most likely to be lonely. A recent study from 
New York University concluded that the loneliest people are 
likely to be poor, uneducated, of minority groups, and unem-
ployed. However, these external conditions were not as strong-
ly related to loneliness as a person's realization of the mis-
match between their actual life and desire life (Rubenstein, 
Shaver, and Peplau, 1979). 
An added dimension to loneliness seems to be that loneli-
ness equals failure. Having people around us equals success. 
In this context, solitude is lonely; thus everyone should 
choose to have people around so they can be a success. The 
reasoning runs in this manner, so we engage in all types of 
events that will bring us in contact with people. 
The association between failure, loneliness, and solitude 
is so strong in Western society that people often find it dif-
ficult to believe that there are people who actually enjoy be-
ing alone. Withdrawal from society by a person may receive 
harsh criticism by others, as if the person were "antisocial," 
a recluse, a "little strange." However, given the complexity 
of society and the ever increasing external constraints of the 
various institutions, withdrawal from society may be a sign 
of strength, not weakness (Gordon, 1976). To withdraw from 
society, in terms of solitude, is much more costly for many 
than to continue finding support from external sources, even 
though such sources may insure the loss of identity by sub-
merging the self into group demands. These external condi-
tions have not always been dominant to the exclusion of all 
else (Tillich, 1963). The modern society, described by Toen-
nies as a gesellschaft, has removed the values of solitude 
and self-reflection by elevating a framework of positive law 
and rationality as the only valid mental construct. Kumar 
(1978) describes such a society and the shift to elevated 
rational constructs: 
Torn from the body of the organic community, the in-
dividual is thrown into large-scale associations to 
which, however, he has no right of membership .. 
Social relationships are governed by the principles 
of rationality and calculation--especially economic 
rationality. Their typical expression is by con-
tract, arrived at by a process of rational compro-
mise among individuals each pursuing his own inter-
est, and sanctioned by a framework of positive law 
(p. 91). 
In addition to positive law and contractual agreements, 
we see the large city, the centralized nation state, and the 
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world market. Though larger numbers of people are more dense-
ly gathered, they have lost their sense of belonging to a com-
man social entity, owing to the contractual and instrumental 
nature of their relationships (Kumar, 1978). This separation 
of self from others and nature by the intervention of legal-
rational systems (Weber, 1922) constitutes the primary condi-
tion of loneliness in modern society. The individual fulfills 
his role in order to attain a higher reward, not because there 
is intrinsic value in being one's self, but because there is 
an economic value toward which he is directed. However, when 
these external desired goals do not match the external attain-
ed goal, the person is not left with any internal support or 
gratification. All seems to be lost; thus enters disparity. 
Feelings of being less than one ought to be, quickly forget-
ting that the rules for "being" are so often indoctrinated 
from an external, artificial, and economic base. 
In short, loneliness is complex and multidimensional. In 
the next section, the author will attempt to initially define 
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several terms and categories pertaining to loneliness so that 
we can better unwind some of its complexities. 
Definitions of Key Terms 
Before going any further, we must examine some key terms 
in our discussion of loneliness. Because of the complexity 
of the emotion of loneliness, its usage is often confused with 
other terms such as isolation, aloneness, alienation, and soli-
tude. To be sure, these terms by many are used synonymously 
with each other in one terminological melting pot. Let us 
then attempt to define loneliness, aloneness, isolation, and 
alienation, respectively. 
Loneliness, defined by Webster (1979), is a state of being 
lonely: (1) being without company; (2) cut off from others; 
(3) not frequented by human beings; desolate; (4) sad from be-
ing alone, lonesome; and (5) producing a feeling of bleakness 
or desolation. Already we can identify problems with such a 
definition, for these "definitions" may well be used for other 
concepts which are typically used synonymously with loneli-
ness. Though loneliness shares characteristics with other 
emotional states, it must have unique qualities of its own, 
that is, a certain dynamic quality that sets it apart. If we 
can recall our own physical and emotional feelings of loneli-
ness, we can usually remember a physical alteration. Some 
feel a pit in their stomachs; others experience loneliness as 
a sort of vertigo or a lack of color to life, a dulling of 
the senses. Other terms commonly used are empty, hollow, a 
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vacuum. What begins to emerge is that we are talking about a 
feeling real and perceived by a given individual. Somehow we 
feel deprivation caused by the lack of contact with someone 
or something real, imagined, remembered, human, or metaphysical. 
Thus we have a dimension of past, present, and future, based on 
human contact and existential experiences. Whether the time 
dimension is based in realism (consumated time) or idealism 
(desired time) can affect the magnitude of felt loneliness. 
Usually both are present, as the two are not easily split ex-
cept in a theoretical dialectic. By way of example, if we 
assume that most human beings are socialized, then we must 
also recognize that they are acutely aware of "supposed to 
be's" or "supposed to do's." An infant is supposed to have 
parents to give him food,protection,as well as love. Children 
are supposed to have parents and peers to love, and within them 
find companionship. As adults we are supposed to complete 
the social cycle with raising families in turn. Whether we 
speak of the family as a primary group or education, religion, 
and other numerous secondary institutions, we are acutely aware 
of the conflict that exists between the real and the ideal. 
As a person matures from childhood through adolescence, he/she 
moves out of primary support groups which emphasized coopera-
tion, nurturance, and affective relations into the externally 
directed relations of competition. Such a structured exis-
tence places external constraints and prescribed modes of be-
havior on the person with little or no input. 
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Finally, we can describe and define loneliness as a feel-
ing, real or perceived, of deprivation in social and intimate 
relations, with unfulfilled material expectations, or existen-
tial feelings, resulting from the conflict between the real 
and ideal. Though this description covers the multidimension-
al nature of loneliness, we must be careful to point out that 
such parameters do not and cannot encompass the numerous be-
havior patterns of individuals as they deal with loneliness. 
Aloneness is the objective condition of being by oneself. 
Although a person may be totally alone, this does not mean he/ 
she feels lonely .. Loneliness is the subjective feeling, while 
aloneness is an objective condition. However, usually people 
who experience loneliness also say they are alone,even in the 
presence of others. 
Isolation is another objective condition of being by one-
self. It is like aloneness but has an added dimension. Here 
detachment is stressed from others because of circumstances 
not under one's control. This may result from sickness, im-
prisonment, or certain types of natural disasters and acci-
dents. 
Alienation usually refers to certain perceptions individ-
uals have about themselves and aspects of their social environ-
ment. According to Urick (1970), alienation is characterized 
by five symptoms. These include social isolation (real or 
perceived), meaninglessness, normlessness, powerlessness, and 
self-estrangement. Man feels separated from himself and 
social others because of conditions external to himself. It 
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is very difficult to speak of alienation in an absolute either-
or sense. It is typified more accurately by degree and direc-
tion. 
It is difficult to distinguish between alienation and 
loneliness, for these two terms may be applied to several of 
the same behavior patterns. However, the feeling with aliena-
tion and loneliness differs qualitatively. A person who is 
alienated may realize that he/she is powerless, leading a norm-
less and meaningless existence, but may continue to seek solu-
tions to the alienated feeling. For the lonely person, the 
feeling is more i~tense to the point of disability, hopeless-
ness, desperation. Instead of feeling he/she does not belong to 
the social world and reconciling this position, the lonely 
person feels as if nothing can be reconciled. Thus we might 
think of loneliness as a specific form or subset of the broad-
er, more general, category of alienation. The differentiation 
is then made by intensity and magnitude of the loss of self. 
Finally, upon examining the definition of loneliness we 
become aware that it exists subjectively. Conversely, alone-
ness, isolation, and alienation, while felt, refer more to an ex-
ternal genesis and the interaction between man and his social 
environment. It is important to keep in mind that loneliness, 
aloneness, isolation, and alienation differ qualitatively and 
by degree, producing similar feelings singly or in combina-
tion with each other. 
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Research Objectives 
The primary concern of this theoretical investigation will 
be to formulate a theoretical framework which incorporates 
various micro and macro level sociological theories as they 
apply to loneliness. Subsequently, a typology of the elements 
contained within the model will be defined and demonstrated by 
use of examples from existing literature, followed by sugges-
tions for the application of the model and possible test pro-
cedures. 
Though the concern of this investigation is predominant-
ly sociological, it will be necessary to present literature 
that is psychological in order that we may understand the 
categorizations of loneliness that have been attempted thus 
far. It is a major premise of this investigation that loneli-
ness, while its symptoms may be explained psychologically, is 
better explained sociologically when seeking to find its eti-
ology. 
For such research to attempt exhausting the contributing 
sociological context of loneliness, this author seeks to prac-
tice what Mills (1959) has referred to as the "sociological 
imagination," that is, the ability to move with relative ease 
from specific social situations to large-scale social struc-
tures and societies and back again. With the sociological 
imagination, the microsociological settings of social interac-
tion may be linked to macrosociological questions of class, 
power, and ethnic relations. To Mills, the sociological 
imagination makes possible an understanding of the larger 
society and the historical scene in terms of their meaning 
for a variety of individuals and an understanding of public 
issues. According to Mills (1959, p. 134), "it requires we 
avoid the arbitrary special iz at ion of academic departments." 
Indeed, the following essay by necessity must include ideas 
from various disciplines to achieve a sociological imagina-
tion of loneliness (Cooley, 1966): 
I think, then, that the supreme aim of social science 
is to perceive the drama of life more adequately than 
can be done by ordinary observation. If it is to 
be objected that this is the task of the artist--a 
Shakespeare, a Goethe, or a Balzac--rather than that 
of a scientist, I may answer that an undertaking so 
vast requires the cooperation of various sorts of 
synthetic minds: artists, scientists, philosophers, 
and men of action. Or I may say that the construc-
tive part of science is, in truth, a form of art (pp. 
402-404). 
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Previous to the construction of a theoretical framework, 
the author will attempt to show,with sociological theories 
and a section concerning social change, why the felt loneli-
ness of individuals stems not necessarily from personal mal-
adaptation, but also from social institutions, societal com-
plexities, and other external manipulations of the social 
world. 
It is the second premise of this investigation that 
changes in industrialization, bureaucratization, secularization, 
resulting alienation, and political ideologies have deliberate-
ly detached man from himself and others from control. Thus 
we will take up these subjects as a backdrop to presenting a 
theoretical framework. 
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When presenting a theoretical framework of etiology for 
loneliness, the author aspires to examine general categories 
of loneliness based on the inner and outer influences placed 
on the individual. The categories are not meant to be dis-
crete so as to allow for the dynamic and processional nature 
of loneliness. 
Though literature has been written concerning loneliness, 
the area lacks application to a general theoretical framework, 
particularly sociological. The implication of this endeavor, 
it is hoped, will become apparent as we proceed. Loneliness 
may be more basic_ to human beings and their behavior than some 
areas now under popular consideration in the sociological 
literature. It may well be that loneliness should be added 




Though aloneness and loneliness are not the same, because 
of the differences in objective and subjective bases, respec-
tively, there are presently more people living alone in the 
United States than ever before. According to the U.S. Census 
Bureau (19 77), there was a 40 percent increase in "one person 
households'' during a six-year period from 1970 to 1976. There 
were more than twice as many "one person households" in 1976 
as there were in 1960. The indications of this report are 
that 15.5 million persons live alone in the United States, or 
21 percent of all American households. Living alone does not 
necessarily mean that these individuals are lonely, but only 
that the physical conditions may be more conducive to feel-
ings of loneliness. 
The Census Bureau offers several suggestions as to why 
such a change has occurred. Marital dissolution has added to 
the number of people living alone. Young single persons and 
the elderly are more capable of financing separate house-
holds, particularly as apartment dwelling becomes more com-
mon. People are postponing marriage and children. When 
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bearing children, the fertility rate is lower. In 1900,there 
were 4.8 persons per household as compared to 2.9 persons 
per household in 1976 (Glick and Norton, 1977). 
Within the past decade, numerous self-help books have 
been published offering advice and numerous case studies in 
an effort to help lonely persons. Most notably, Moustakas 
(1961, 1972, 1975) discussed the benefits of loneliness as 
an integral part of becoming a total human being. However, 
though Moustakas mentions social elements as the creators of 
much emotional turmoil, he does not pursue much investigation 
into these problems. He instead seeks to give prescriptions 
of how persons may better cope with their circumstances in 
which they find themselves. This may be sufficient for a 
self-help book but does little in examining the root causes 
of loneliness. A transactional therapist, Eric Berne (1961), 
stressed "stroke" economies individuals may develop for them-
selves as a unit of recognition, structuring their time to 
receive the positive or negative reinforcement they need. 
Ira Tanner (1973), another transactional therapist, has sug-
gested as a cause that loneliness is experienced by individu-
als because of their "fear of love." He blamed a lack of 
affection in childhood and suggested the "strokes" of affec-
tion and compassion as a panacea. Tanner (1973) explains: 
Our understanding of loneliness depends mainly upon 
the perspective from which we view love. We see it 
usually from different vantage points: 
'I don't deserve to be loved and I'll 
prove it.' I'm not O.K.--you're O.K. 
'I don't trust people who want to give 
love and I'll prove it.' I'm O.K.--
you're not O.K. 
'I've given up trying to give love or re-
ceive it.' I'm not O.K.--you're not O.K. 
'I will try to give love and receive it.' 
I'm O.K.--you're O.K. 
16 
Accordingly, the reason many persons never break away 
from loneliness is the insistence on making others responsible 
for our individual fears of love. Transactional therapists 
focus on the "Not O.K." feeling within the individual as one 
permanent emotion of an inferior personality. Feelings of 
inferiority, based on a fear of love, are a basic condition 
of childhood, leaving no one even in adulthood to escape lone-
liness (Mencken,1963). Here again, we find no reference in 
transactional theories, to the social mechanisms and change 
that have brought about the rampant increase in loneliness. 
This seems almost to say that loneliness is a problem of mal-
adjusted persons who cannot cope, and the world about us is 
not responsible, leaving the cause for deficiency with the 
individual. 
Viktor Frankl (1963), taking an existential approach to 
human problems, held that man is a spiritual being motivated 
not by the will to pleasure or the will to power, but by the 
will to meaning. Loneliness is a state of melancholia where 
persons become desensitized to the inherent values in their 
own being and subsequently to the values outside themselves. 
This increases to a point that persons view themselves, others, 
and life as meaningless. Guilt arises from feelings of in-
sufficiency resulting in existential tension which in turn 
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becomes eradicable guilt. Thus loneliness is seen as self-
perpetuating. Howard (1975), also an existentialist, main-
tained that loneliness is inherent in the human condition, 
asserting the responsibility of each individual finding solu-
tions for loneliness. Again we observe that no mention is 
made of external social factors as the producing forces of 
loneliness. 
Gordon (1976) attempted to demonstrate through interviews 
the severe loneliness which is common particularly among the 
elderly and isolated persons in America. Several other at-
tempts have been made in explaining peripheral aspects of 
loneliness while examining other problem areas. Zimbardo 
(1977) studied shyness. Caine (1974, 1978) studied the 
widowed. The timid and the assertive were studied by Bach 
and Goldberg (1975), and Bower and Bower (1976). Divorced 
and the newly single were examined by Hunt and Hunt (1977), 
Johnson (1977), and Wydra (1978). Not withstanding, the 
scanty research on loneliness specifically, studies on mean-
ing in life, life satisfaction, and happiness have demon-
strated that feelings of loneliness are pervasive (Acuff and 
Allen, 1970; Hynson, 1970; Lowenthal, 1964; Peppers and Knapp, 
1980). 
Theories such as transactional analysis, existentialism, 
and other psychological models fall into place as individual-
istic or dispositional perspectives of loneliness. The indi-
vidualistic perspective seeks to ascertain what it is about 
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a person that causes him/her to feel lonely in a given situa-
tion when others do not. 
Sul 1 i van (19 5 3) maintained that lonel in es s was an inborn 
need for intimacy which arose if frustrated. If intimacy 
through the developmental stages of life is not present (with 
parents, peers, members of the opposite sex), loneliness will 
remain a critical problem. 
Studies in ethological research maintain similar conclu-
sions to that of Sullivan. Morris (1971) concluded that man 
through his evolution is a social animal, finding punishment 
when isolated fo~ long periods of time. Bowlby (1973) assert-
ed that humans through their evolution have developed a prox-
imity promoting mechanism based on the notion that it is safer 
for them to travel and live together. Being alone or feeling 
alone is a fear of human instinct. Fromm and Reichmann (1959) 
in a study of a pyschiatric population pointed to a wide-
spread fear of loneliness but maintained that "real" loneli-
ness was found only in psychotics. 
Thus, we can observe that individualistic theories of 
loneliness are diverse, basing the problem of loneliness on 
evolution or maladaptive patterns of behavior. Obviously, 
these theories only explain a part of the underlying condi-
tion affecting loneliness. However, it is necessary to at 
least make note of the work in the individualistic theories 
so that we may better understand the significance of social 
theories concerning this subject. 
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What emerges from the literature pertaining to loneli-
ness can be generally separated into two categories: (1) the 
individualistic perspective including transactional analysis, 
psycho-analysis, evolution, and existential approaches in ex-
plaining loneliness; and (2) the social-cultural perspective 
which concentrates on the interaction of persons in groups 
and macro-level sociological factors. Primarily the main 
difference between the foregoing categorization would seem 
to be in the premise of causation. While the individualistic 
perspectives place the problem of loneliness within the indi-
vidual as the source, the social-cultural perspective focuses 
on the external groups, organizations, institutions, and soci-
etal conditions that have been the source of felt loneliness 
in individuals. With regard to the present investigation, 
emphasis will be placed on the social-cultural as well as the 
subsequent theoretical framework. 
Let us then proceed to review the sociological theories 
that have been applied to loneliness and related topics, as 
well as several perpsectives that may apply but havenot been 
utilized specifically for a discussion of loneliness. 
Social-Cultural Perspectives 
The social-cultural perspective focuses concern on the 
societal level of analysis as it pertains to the generation 
of loneliness in the individual. The author has chosen to 
include under this dimension certain socio-psychological per-
spectives which, though previously have not been applied to 
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loneliness in particular, are an integral part of the social-
cultural perspective. Especially is this the case when con-
sidering shared meanings and patterns of behavior reactions 
socially constructed. 
The interactionist perspective of Mead (1918) emphasiz-
ed the formation of the self. By understanding how the self 
is formed, we can hopefully draw upon some reasons for lone-
liness in humans. According to Mead, human behavior is not 
a matter of responding directly to the behavior of others 
but rather to the intention of that behavior. It is respond-
ing in such a rna~ner that brings about the formation of the 
"self" (Meltzer, 1964). The self is the result of a social 
process within the individual involving two distinct parts--
the "I" and the "Me." The "I" is the impulsive, spontaneous, 
disorganized aspect of the human being. The "Me" can be seen 
as the organized set of attitudes, definitions, and meanings 
common to the group. The "I" initiates the act while the 
"Me" gives direction to the act. As Mead (1918) asserts: 
The 'I' or the ego is identical with the anal vtic 
or synthetic processes of cognition, which in' con-
flicting situations reconstructs out of the proto 
plasmic states of consciousness both the empirical 
self (the 'me'), and the world of object. The ob-
jective world is a mental construct and is defined 
in t e rm s o f the needs o f the ' I ' o f the e go . I t is 
man's reply to his own talk. Such a me is not then 
projected and ejected into the bodies of other 
people to give them the breath of human life. It 
is rather an importation from the field of social 
objects into an amorphous, unorganized field of 
what we call inner experience. Through the organ-
ization of this object, the self, this material is 
itself organized and brought under the control of 
the individual in the form of so-called self con-
sciousness (p. 401). 
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Thus the "I" offers the abilities for innovative, crea-
tive activity. The "Me," being regulatory, places on the 
individual the disposition to be socially goal-directed and 
conforming. Within the self, then, we have the basis for 
social control and novel behavior simultaneously. 
Upon examining Mead's notion of "self" formation, he de-
scribes the interaction of the "I" and "Me" as a process. 
That is, a reciprocity of the inner drives and the outer con-
straints. Often those persons who say they are lonely de-
scribe their condition as a loss of identity, or in terms 
such as "I feel lost " "I don't know who I am " or "'Nhat am 
. ' ' 
I doing with my life?" Ideally, Mead's processes of social 
activity seem to apply best to societies which are less com-
plex than those which the lonely person must deal with today 
(Figure 1). This author would concur with Mead that social 
relations should have a reciprocity for their existence. How-
ever, external structural constraints force a static rela-
tionship upon the individual's "me," denying a reciprocity 
of action of meaning to exist. Identity, meaning, and the 
self become externally constructed. The "I" is negated as 
external meaning in a rational scheme is seen as the only 
acceptable meaning. An ideal-typic rational scheme forces 
the imbalance of the self. The model in Figure 2 is used by 
way of illustration. 
We see in Mead's "self'1 the opportunity for mutual in-
put into a situation, its meaning, and outcome. This rela-
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22 
23 
or peers. But in a secondary rational structure such as in-
stitutions of education, religion, industry, and government, 
the "self" of Mead becomes something other than social, based 
on legal authority, power, wealth, and coercion. As we exam-
ine a bureaucratic structure, a whole series of patterns as 
the one just depicted begins to emerge. 
Figure 3 represents the "Me" always as receiver of in-
structions,orders, or prescriptions, with the "I" as deflated 
and nonconsequential. The process of Mead's "self" no longer 
exists as a reciprocity, mutually derived, even though the 
meanings may be shared and the remnants of the "I" existent. 
The legal rational structures have turned what was a process 
into a static mechanistic construct. 
According to Chapman (1972): 
Where the 'I' aspects of the self are conditioned 
away and the contributions of 'I's' of other per-
sons no longer have meaning, human values have 
been negated and lost. Where the remaining part 
of self,the conditioned 'me; is reduced to a spe-
cific utility response of 'system needs' and 
nothing more, changing only as a system needs 
change, then for human beings mutilation has 
progressed so far that death becomes seductive 
and desirable (p. 30). 
Though it may be argued that an individual has the pre-
rogative to withstand external imputed demands of a nonsocial 
rational structure (Mead, 1912), we must also acknowledge the 
effects of socialization. Secondary, nonreciprocating social-
ization dominates the lives of individuals perpetuated by the 
parents and peers, who themselves have been and are being so-
cialized by events and structures external to them. Most of 
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Figure 3. Bureaucratic Asocial Directives 
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our waking lives after about the age of a preschool child is 
spent in contact with some form of social institution. 
Another interactionist perspective is that of Cooley 
(1902). Cooley asserted that human nature is very social in 
content, consisting of three elements: the primary group, 
human nature, and the looking glass self. The individual is 
not only acquiring social standards but developing a self 
that reflects the definitions of society. At this level, in-
dividuals are extremely susceptible to social influences and 
control. According to Cooley (1902): 
As we see our face, figure and dress in the glass 
and are interested in them because they are ours, 
and pleased or otherwise with them according as 
they do or do not answer to what we should like 
them to be; so in imagination we perceive in an-
other's mind some thought of our appearance, man-
ners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on 
and are various·1y affected by it. . . . The thing 
that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere 
mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed 
sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection 
upon another's mind (p. 36). 
Thus, the self consists of the imagined expectancies and 
reflection of others the individual encounters. In reference 
to primary groups, Cooley (1902) characterizes these groups 
as intimate face-to-face association and cooperation,describ-
ing the "we" fusion as sympathetic and mutual. These fusions 
between individuals create the unity where all have input. 
With regard to communities, Cooley (1902), like Toennies, 
characterizes them as: 
habits of free cooperation and discussion almost 
uninfluenced by the character of the state; and it 
is a familiar and well supported view that the vil-
lage commune, self-governing as regards local 
affairs are habituated to discussion, are a very 
widespread institution in settled communities, and 
the continuator of a similar autonomy previously 
existing in the clan .... In our own cities the 
crowded tenements and the general economic and so-
cial confusion have sorely wounded the family and 
neighborhood (p. 43). 
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The breakdown of primary social relations has found con-
tinuance in our society at the present time. The centraliza-
tion of government and industry as we continue toward social 
"progress" has substituted secondary relations which are non-
mutual and imposed for the primary groups, traditional family 
group, and the community. Loneliness may then be seen as a 
breakdown of the community "we"-ness, where individuals now 
are forced to look out for number one that a competitive 
legal-rational society demands, disregarding the cooperative 
mutual trust that characterized primary groups. If man's 
primary social relations are destroyed, man will cease to be 
social, which undermines the survival functions of the family 
(Cooley, 1909). 
Goffman (1959), with his dramaturgical approach, assumes 
the individual has an active role in determining the nature 
of the self. A key concept in this approach concerns impres-
sion management through the use of performances, props, and 
routines. According to Goffman (1959): 
The perspective employed in the report is that of 
the theatrical performance; the principles derived 
are dramaturgical ones. I shall consider the way 
in which the individual ... presents himself and 
his activity to others, the way in which he guides 
and controls the impressions they form of him, and 
the kinds of things he may or may not do while sus-
taining his performance before them (p. xi). 
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We find Goffman viewing the individual as an actor on a 
stage, it would seem, in an inauthentic manner. True or real 
attitudes and beliefs of an individual can only be ascertain-
ed indirectly, never knowing with certainty what the latent 
motives may be. The content of any activity presented by an 
individual or the role it plays in an ongoing social process 
does not receive emphasis by Goffman, but the form the drama-
turgical problem takes for the individual when presenting 
their activities before others. Many commentators have crit-
icized Goffman for his conceptions of "humanity as the big 
con," the reduction of humanity to an act or performance, the 
"phony" element in all social performances, and man as a role 
player and manipulator of props, costumes, gestures, and 
words (Cuzort, 1969). 
However, Goffman is criticized because his ideas of im-
pression management, based on opportunist morals, are asocial 
in nature. These perspectives may fit well the society that 
has moved away from primary social gemeinschaft into a secon-
dary self gain gesellschaft. Gouldner (1970), in commenting 
on Goffman's approach, points out that modern men and women 
are likely to be functionaries or clients of large-scale 
bureaucratic organizations over which they have little influ-
ence. Lacking this influence on organizational structure and 
its functions, they bend their efforts to the management of 
impressions that will maintain or enhance their status. Even 
values found in aesthetic standards have been reduced to the 
appearance of things (Gouldner, 1970). 
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Brittan (1973) believes such appearances have always 
played a part in social behavior, but never before has appear-
ance been attached to aesthetics or in such a comprehensive 
fashion as in modern society. If values, morals, beauty, happi-
ness, and meaning in life are but external appearances and 
acts, is it any wonder individuals feel empty, isolated in 
the presence of others, and alienated? Loneliness, it is held 
by several sociologists, is caused by the inherent alienation 
in modern society (Arendt, 1951; Fromm, 1955; Kenniston,1960; 
and Seeman, 1975). The elderly, handicapped, racial minori-
ties, and city dwe_llers are feeling powerless and their lives 
are meaningless, due to the crowding, urbanization, and separa-
tion from nature (Simmel, 1950). But loneliness is affecting 
not only these groups, though if well concealed in a perform-
ance as Goffman asserts, the loneliness may not be externally 
apparent. If loneliness is prevalent, why would an individu-
al seek to conceal it, especially if he/she was aware of the 
social causes attached to the felt loneliness? Again we come 
back to America being a success-oriented society, highly com-
petitive, and promoting of behavior based on only self-
interest. Gordon (1976) suggests that Americans are encour-
aged to blame failure on themselves ("You can't cope;" "You're 
not able to adapt;" "You're weak"). Failure then carries a 
social stigmatization. To admit you are lonely is to admit 
social failure. 
Reisman (1971) commented that Americans' expectations 
are too high, based on the state of society. We want to be 
29 
"cheerful," "happy," "successful," and "competent," but if we 
do not achieve these goals we suffer, not realizing that such 
goals are internally wrought. The industrial man, though, 
seeks to find what was once internally generated now turns 
to external sources. A shift has been made from internal 
striving to external controlling. Very much like the shift 
in Sorokin's (1971) swing from Ideational to Sensate forms· 
of socio-cultural change. Thus, shame and loneliness are 
associated, resulting in a "vicious circle of self-doubt and 
self-pity," as if to be lonely were some sort of un-American 
activity (Weiss, 1973). 
In addition, the magnitude of the American political 
structures render to an individual feelings of being cut off 
from control and helpless (Kornhauser, 1959; and Nisbet, 195~. 
By the influence of external structures, the recent trend of 
"looking out for number one" has been advocated by profession-
als, clergy, mass media, and self help books as if to reassure 
people that they do have an internal locus of control in the 
midst of unchallengeable external influence. Thus, the para-
dox is revealed of desiring to maintain individualism but 
running the risk of becoming a social outcast. Or, converse-
ly, adhering to the notions of progress, bureaucratization, 
and modernity to avoid condemnation, while at the same time 
losing a core identity by maintaining a continued imputed 
identity (Wolfe, 1976; Ringer, 1977; and Dyer, 1978). Ideal-
ly, we seek to do both; however, rarely can this be accom-
plished, for it is difficult to discern genuine activity 
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from facades. Pirsig (1974) maintains that pure individual-
ism is underconformity while the modern organizational man 
is an overconformist. We thus label them as psychotic or 
neurotic, respectively. Most fall on the continuum somewhere 
between the polarized states. Trying to maintain a middle 
position on the continuum, however, creates anxiety and frus-
tration as well. According to Slater (1970), the needs of 
community, engagement, and dependence are frustrated by the 
commitment in America to individualism, competition, and inde-
pendence; he admits "the competitive life is a lonely one." 
American role demands, at the same time, stimulate and frus-
trate needs which are basic to humans (Reisman, 1961; and 
Slater, 1970). The ethos of individuality and the insistence 
on competition inevitably generate alienation. Americans 
maintain the urge for a separate house, ca~ telephone, and tele~ 
vision. The more we charge after privacy the more lonely we 
feel (Slater, 1970). People become a bother to us if we must 
break an insititutional routine for social interactions. 
Bowman (1955) focused on social change as the dominant agent 
of loneliness. The primary group contacts have been severely 
reduced in frequency and intensity. Fearing autonomy and 
isolation, modern man has become compulsively conformist in an 
attempt to escape lonely feelings. This is derived from a 
powerless feeling, economically and politically (Fromm, 1941). 
This "compulsive conformity" is characterized by Re is man 
(1961) as a middle class America giving up autonomy and social 
freedom in order to gain approval in an individualistic and 
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competitive society. The person who is overly conformist 
possesses a "false personalization" because of the inability 
to face the fear and loneliness of autonomy. False personal-
ization appears to be very similar to Goffman's dramaturgi-
cal approach. We engage in overconformity, false impressions, 
and self-interest in order that we may be met with approval 
and rewards. Thus we are bound to an inauthentic secondary 
system of relations. 
Reisman (1961), in The Lonely Crowd, has presented a dis-
cussion of loneliness, setting forth a typology of man as be-
ing "directed" in various ways as social-structural changes 
have occurred. These sources of direction include: (1) trad-
itionally-directed, (2) inner-directed, and (3) outer-directed 
persons. These three types of social character are related 
to specific periods of time and cultural-historical change. 
Reisman views societies, particularly Western society, as 
moving through an S-shaped pattern of population growth. It 
is his thesis that each of the three different phases on the 
population curve appears to be occupied by a society that en-
forces conformity and molds social character in a definably 
different way. 
The overriding character traits that a society possesses 
are seen to be affected by macro-level shifts in population 
size and the concurrent historical-cultural shifts that take 
place. Tradition-directed persons obtained a place in soci-
ety by age-grade, clan, or caste. According to Reisman 
(1961), such societies are roughly comparable to Europe 
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before the Renaissance and seventh century. Innovative be-
havior or deviants were preserved by the important process 
of fitting them into existing roles such as shaman or sorcer-
er. Society was aimed at survival because of the high mor-
tality rates. Such a society based its lifestyle on folk, 
status, and gemeinschaft relations, characterized by a rela-
tively slow change, dependence on family and kinship net-
works, and a fairly homogeneous web of values societywide. 
Allowances were made for the reciprocity of ideas, values, and 
beliefs encompassing a socially-derived consensus about 
issues. 
A social structure imposing inner direction consists of 
increased personal mobility, rapid accumulation of capital, 
technological shifts, constant expansionism, colonialization, 
and imperialism. The source of direction for the individual 
is "inner," in the sense that it is implanted early in life 
by the elders and directed toward generalized, inescapable 
destined goals. Thus, inner-directed man receives more input 
to the self with little or no opportunity for reciprocity. 
Such a society presents its members with a great variety of 
aims--money, possessions, power, knowledge, fame; but such 
"aims" have not been socially derived as in a traditionally-
directed society,where survival tasks are dominant, as well 
as more of an equity between individual supply and demand, 
production and consumption. An inner-directed society finds 
its members having to constantly adapt to changes in techno-
logy, suffering from the "cultural lag" (Ogburn, 1922). 
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The primary groups, family and peers, are loosened as well 
as the affective ties that are maintained by them. The affec-
ties become secondary as the shift is made to "other-direct-
edness." Affective relations become validated by conformity 
to mass media stereotype modes of industrial efficiency, mass 
rationality or assumed rationality, where acceptable behavior 
is no longer socially bargained for but engineered for "sys-
terns maintenance" (Parsons, 1951). The other-directed indi-
vidual has as his/her source of direction others upon whom 
he/she must depend for validation and, unlike the inner-
directed person who is engaged in the acting, is acted upon. 
To illustrate Reisman's concepts of character types, consider 
the following diagram (Figure 4) presenting the related con-
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Figure 4. Typologies of Societal Change (Lauer, 1973) 
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As noted in Figure 4, Reisman's theory resembles other 
theorists of social change, with the exception of adding the 
transitional category of inner-direction. The "false person-
fication" spoken of by Reisman (1961) that is developed in 
modern society leads to widespread anomic patterns of thought 
and behavior. Children and adults are oversteered, maintain-
ing super ego controls to the point of disallowance for nor-
mal satisfaction and the escape of other personality traits. 
This results in a sizeable number of Americans who exhibit 
clinical symptoms. What are these symptoms? Reisman (1961) 
compares post-World War II soldiers hospitalized for apathy 
with the modern widespread anomics: 
The most striking characteristic of the apathetic 
patient is his visible lack of emotion and drive. 
At first glance he may seem to be depressed; closer 
scrutiny however reveals lack of affect. He appears 
slowed up in the psy~hic and motor responses; he 
shows an emptiness of expression and a masklike 
face .... They behave very well ... complying with 
rules and regulations. They rarely complain and 
make no demands ... (p. 244). 
It is the author's observation that such behavior is per-
vasive in America today. One must only look at others in 
restaurants, subways, night clubs, and any number of social 
gatherings. High conformity, in terms of clothing, etiquette, 
smiles, handshakes, and segregation by institutional status are 
present. But, as just described, one finds a lack of primary 
affect, lack of emotion and drive (except possibly when such 
would pay off in monetary or material gains), and mask-like 
faces. All of the external appearances of affluence and hap-
piness are maintained while at the same time there is an 
internal loss of identity and emptiness. Silberman (1970) 
describes the paradoxical nature of this condition: 
economic growth reduces poverty, but it also 
produces congestion, noise, and pollution of the en-
vironment. Technological change widens the indi-
vidual's range of choice and makes economic growth 
possible; it also dislocated workers from their 
jobs and their neighborhoods. Affluence plus new 
technology frees men from slavery to the struggle 
for existence, from the brutalizing labor that had 
been man's condition since Adam; it thereby forces 
them to confront the questions of life's meaning 
and purpose, even while it destroys the faith that 
once provided the answers (p. 145). 
Finally, Reisman's character typologies are based on 
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population trends that he posits are S-shaped and occur in all 
civilizations as ·they develop. In the latest preface to his 
book The Lonely Crowd, he modifies the population thesis as 
a determiner of the character types, though adheres to his 
typological scheme as indicative of societal development. 
Park (1950), in his notion of marginal man, emphasizes 
that while an individual's personality has a physiological 
make-up, it achieves its final form under the individual 
concept of self. This conception is determined by the role 
which society assigns to him, and the attitudes others in 
society form of him. Thus, according to Park, self concept 
is a social product. The "marginal man" is a person consid-
ered not to be an ingroup or outgroup member. Park (1950) 
asserts: 
This personality type arises at a time and place 
where, out of conflict of races and culture, new 
societies, people, and cultures are coming into 
existence. The marginal man must live at the same 
time in two worlds culturally and socially. In-
evitably, he becomes relatively to his cultural 
milieu the individual with the wider horizon, the 
keener intelligence, and the more detached and ra-
tional viewpoint (p. 40). 
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However, it is also pointed out by Park that frequently 
the marginal man feels displaced and alienated as a result 
of his pseudo-cohesiveness to several groups. Because of 
the rapid changes in society, it would seem that many indi-
viduals are "marginal," increasing the feelings of loneliness 
and its perpetuation. If, because of rapid social change, in-
dividuals suffer from "cultural lag" (Ogburn, 1922), then non-
material culture--that is, internal values, meaning, and be-
liefs--are never changing quite as rapidly as the material 
culture. "Marginal man"-ness continues. Stonequist (1973) 
speaks of a cultural duality facing the marginal man. His 
clash is not between inborn temperament and social expecta-
tions but between congenial personality tendencies and the 
patterns of a given culture. The problem is not adjusting 
to one self, but to several selves, that the role requirements 
of a society place on the individual. To harmonize these 
selves and integrate them so that a meaningful inner life 
can be achieved is a problem. In a society of rapid social 
change where different codes of conduct exist, the difficulty 
of developing a meaningful existence is complicated as a func-
tion of rate of change. This can be the case for an immigrant 
to a new country, crossing racial boundaries, ideological 
changes in religion and politics, or by the crossing of boun-
daries with strong sectional traditions (such as move from a 
small town in West Virginia to the Watts are of Los Angeles, 
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California). Such mobility is demanded of Americans today 
by industry for economic success. Social cohesiveness in 
primary groups is replaced with large groups of individuals 
who are marginal personalities. Stonequist (1937) admits: 
One sees this dislocation clearly and sharply in 
the case of those individuals who fall between 
two major racial or cultural groups, but it is 
also apparent in the relations of groups such as 
social classes, religious sects, and communities. 
The individual who, through migration, education, 
marriage, or some other influence, leaves one 
social group or culture with making satisfac-
tory adjustment to another finds himself on the 
margin of each but a member of neither (p. 22). 
Such mobility as described above was studied by Packard 
(1972) in A Nation of Strangers. Geographic mobility deteri-
orates social networks, leaving only the mass communication 
network in which people must relate. Packard says this is 
the main cause of unhappiness, loneliness, and divorce in 
America. The average person in the United States moves 14 
times, and 40 million persons change their addresses yearly. 
The result is a deprivation of a sense of identity (U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau, 1977). 
In addition to geographic mobility, cultural conflict 
plays a commanding role in the loss of identity. In a soci-
ety where social classes are sharply defined, the upward 
mobility of an individual exposes them to social tension. 
Sumner (1906, p. 31) writes, "If a man passes from one social 
class to another, his acts show the contrast between the mores 
in which he finds himself." Strict conformity to rules and 
regulations in industry may insure a promotion. If promoted, 
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the person finds himself in a position now as boss over the 
persons who had formerly been contemporaries. The primary 
social interaction of peer to peer is broken down by the sec-
ondary institutional positioning. The person in this position 
suffers internal conflict, nevertheless conforms ever mor~ 
ardently for job security, prestige and monetary rewards. If 
one continues to move upward in a pyramidal structure, the 
potential peer group continues to lessen. The author choses 
to term this "situational loneliness." That is, because of 
the secondary imposition of "codes for success" and the over-
conformity of the-person, material success may be achieved, 
but identity in terms of close friends and primary interaction 
become less obtainable. The common expression, "it's lonely 
at the top," may be quite accurate in this sense. We must 
not think that only upward mobility can create loneliness for 
downward mobility or remaining in.the same position in social 
structure can influence loneliness. Consider the 1960's when 
many youngsters were leaving middle and upper-middle class 
families to strive for a simpler existence. They created new 
subculture and counter culture movements, because of the alien-
ation they said had forced them to look for less materialistic 
values than what their parents espoused. But the loneliness 
of individualism affected them nonetheless. Those persons 
that remain stable in the movement within social strata see 
their peers and friends moving and shifting (or trying to) 
while they remain relatively stable. Again we see the paradox 
develop that upward mobility and geographic mobility may be 
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sought to enhance economic gain, causing overconformity. 
Those who seek downward mobility through alternative life-
styles, sub- and countercultures try to reject the dominant 
values of economic gain, thereby turning to individualism. 
Each end of the continuum finds loneliness a major factor in 
its effect. 
Weiss (1973) has focused on disengagement theory as a 
descriptive model for loneliness. As society has increased 
in mobility and complexity, individuals are forced to con-
stantly engage and disengage themselves from significant 
others. This may occur developmentally in terms of age and 
peer pressures, but formal positioning in a social strata 
such as a bureaucracy or geographic mobility. These constant 
shifts in structural definitions and boundaries reduce the 
chance for the longevity of relations with other persons. 
Weiss views loneliness as a relational deficit caused by 
either emotional or social isolation. The former reflects 
the absence of intimate relations with a parent, spouse, or 
·lover, while the latter refers to the absence of involvement 
with a network of peers. Emotional isolation, the lack of 
an intimate tie, produces distress, driving restlessness, a 
re-experience of childhood abandonment anxiety, a "nameless" 
fear, and loneliness. Social isolation--the lack of a net-
work of peer involvement--leads to boredom, feelings of ex-
clusion, alienation, aimlessness, and loneliness. The dis-
tinction between emotional and .social isolation can be diffi-
cult. Some have argued that emotional isolation is more 
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accurately described as "desolation." That is, people who 
lose a close attachment are more likely to feel emotionally 
bothered and lonely more so than those who have never had 
one (Shanas, 1968; and Townsend, 1957). Being isolated is 
not axiomatic with being lonely. 
Thus, we can observe that loneliness is a subject that 
has been investigated by several persons in the social sci-
ences, alluded to by some, and equated with a variety of con-
ditions in which man finds himself. Within the sociological 
perspectives, there appears to this author two areas which 
require investigation in more depth. The first of these is 
the concept of s6cial change, as we have moved into modern-
ity with notions of progress. The second is the recurring 
paradox of individualism as opposed to overconformity spoken 
of by Stonequist (1937), Fromm (1941), Nisbet (1953), Bowman 
(1955), Kornhauser (1959), Reisman (1961), Slater (1970), and 
Weiss (1973). What is it about social change in America that 
has produced such inner conflict in terms of identity and 
loneliness? 
Summary 
In this chapter the writer has sought to examine per-
spectives concerning loneliness. We have looked at psycho-
logical, social-psychological, and sociological investigations 
by several individuals. Some of the areas of review were 
specifically focused on loneliness while other areas were 
more general. What seemed to surface in the sociological 
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perspectives concerning loneliness were two recurrent themes: 
social change and an individual's reaction to that change, 
consisting of a dilemma between individualism and overcon-
formi ty to secondary institutional demands. 
In Chapter III, we will investigate social change and 
loneliness more in depth, seeking to cast some insight on 
how loneliness developed into such a pervasive phenomenon. 
If we can discern where a breakdown in self-identity and 
loneliness occurred, it will then be possible to better typify 
loneliness and its dynamic as a framework for understanding 
present-day problems. Thus, we may generate future quantita-
tive and qualitative research on the topic. 
CHAPTER III 
SOCIAL CHANGE AND LONELINESS 
As we begin to trace the social change that occurred in 
the Western world, we must begin during the feudal period in 
European history. The state as we know it today did not 
exist. Order was maintained on a personal and customary 
basis. The feudal (Gemeinschaft) attitude toward nature was 
one of passive conformity, accepting both the rewards and 
hardships of daily matters. Economic activity was judged 
according to need or use values, not by exchange or the mar-
ket values of want (Rossides, 1978). The center of social 
being lay in tradition, either because it was of divine ori-
gin or because it had successfully withstood the test of 
time. The political order was maintained on a personal, cus-
tomary basis. According to Rossides (1978): 
There was no impersonal, bureautic, civil and mili-
tary administration, and no state organized on a 
legal-territorial basis with attributes of sover-
eignty. Feudal populations did not distinguish 
among law, custom, and morality, and they believed 
that the structure of intertwined norms in which 
they had their being had always existed as known 
at that time (p. 17). 
Rather than a separation from nature characterized by a 
calculating egotistical reason, a collective sentiment exist-
ed. Social relations were seen in the family, the village, 
and the towns, or the corporate organization of guilds, 
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colleges, churches, and religious communities (Kumar, 1978). 
The basic organization of the Gemeinschaft was the family, 
which dominated ties of kinship, neighborhoods, friendship, 
and geographical location (Toennies, 1957). 
Conversely, in the modern Gesellschaft society man is 
removed from the community organization, based on the family 
unit, and shifted into large-scale associations of which he 
is expected to give no more than a part of himself. Social 
relations are now, for many, governed by the principles of 
rationality and calculation, especially economic rationality 
(Kumar, 1978). This economic rationality now dominates the 
institutions of education, religion, and government in the 
Gesellschaft society of the present day, shifting morals and 
ethics into monetary policy. Self interest has replaced the 
community of the Gemeinschaft, leaving persons as isolates 
in an adversary relationship with others (Toennies, 1957). 
Though persons in a Gesellschaft society are more dense-
ly gathered, Toennies (1957, p. 20) foresaw that "everybody 
is by himself and isolated." The sketch drawn of rational-
ity based on self-interest is deeply rooted in the idea of 
liberalism which was pervasive during the enlightenment peri-
od. The ideas of the scientist and philosophers developed 
the notion that, by national progress and positivism, society 
could speed its evolution toward a Utopia. 
With the enlightenment period, social philosophers sought 
to utilize the logic of Greeks as they pondered society. A 
fusion was made between Christian and Greek philosophies, 
particularly as the Roman Catholic church lost its dominant 
control in Europe. In The City of God, Saint Augustine, in 
the fifth century, by way of a philosophy of history and a 
theory of development, looked forward to the end of secular 
history as civilization moved from an earthly existence into 
a heavenly city. The "Golden Age" was seen to be always just 
ahead for Augustine, as well as for Kant and Saint-Simon 300 
years later. 
The sketch of the future was a society under the manage-
ment of scientists and industrialists, speeding society to-
ward the Utopian ideal. The philosophers of the time combin-
ed evolutionary theories of Darwin and Spencer with the reli-
gious Utopian ideal and the industrial progress ideas. It 
seemed every area of inquiry was seeking to determine how 
best to accelerate the attainment of bliss. One cannot crit-
icize the thought of creating a world of harmony and order. 
However, the means for achieving such a world were imbued 
with rational constructions of thought, institutions, and 
bureaucracy, which could not and have not accounted for the 
bipolarity of reality construction--namely, those aspects 
which are irrational, spontaneous, and impulsive. Novel be-
havior and change do not fit well into a "rational" construc-
tion of society. 
Scientific reasoning and calculation would be applied 
to all problems of values and ethics, so that social conflicts 
could be resolved by appeal to criteria which were universal-
ly accepted. Weber (1922), though he maintained that society 
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would finalize itself in legal-rational bureaucracy, surpris-
ingly issues a grim vision: 
Together with the machine, the bureaucratic organiza-
tion is engaged in building the houses of bondage 
of the future, in which perhaps men will one day be 
like peasants in the ancient Egyptian State, acquies-
cent and powerless, while a purely technical good, 
that is rational, official administration and provi-
sion becomes the sole, final value, which sovereignly 
decides the direction of their affairs (p. 56). 
The great appeal of Utopian progress was the possibility 
of eliminating chance and capriciousness in human life. By 
using logic and pure reason, science could eliminate not only 
physical problems of disease and plague but could also engi-
neer social concerns into a rational scheme. By joining phy-
sical science with social philosophy a new area of "social 
physics" could emerge (Comte, 1830). Ideally, social prescrip-
tions were to be made by the experts, men of knowledge, engi-
neers, mathematicians, and economists. Bankers and industrial-
ists would conduct their affairs without bias or political 
position, basing their decisions on the new society. The 
difference seems to be in what or who has dominated. Person-
al dominance by a king or lord has been replaced by depend-
ence on an objective order of things which is generated by a 
higher rationality. The constraints on life are to live and 
die rationally and productively. However, the Utopian ideal 
and the constructed apparatus for achieving that ideal defeat-
ed its own purpose to create a humane existence. By the tech-
nical utilization of persons as "things," the struggle for 
existence became more scientific and rational. While 
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scientific management and divisions of l.ab.or increased produc-
tivity in nearly all areas including the standard of living, 
the patterns of behavior and the mind revealed critical prob-
lems and oppression. Increasing the role of capital destroy-
ed the medieval social system, removing the individual from 
a relatively stable community relationship (Fromm, 1941). 
The paradox for the individual under such circumstances 
was freedom from the bondage of economic and political ties 
while simultaneously being freed from the ties which used to 
give him security and a feeling of belonging. The relation-
ship between per~ons was greatly altered as they moved away 
from these ties of security and belonging (Fromm, 1921) 
His relationship to his fellow men, with everyone 
as potential competitor, has become hostile and es-
tranged; he is free--that is, he is alone, isolated, 
threatened from all sides ... he is overwhelmed 
with a sense of his individual nothingnessandhelp-
lessness. . . . The new freedom is bound to create 
a deep feeling of insecurity,powerlessness,doubt, 
aloneness, and anxiety (pp. 80-81). 
The image of evolutionary progress toward a Utopia held 
by social philosophers of the 18th century sought to obtain 
a "paradise" by objectification and a rationalizing of the 
social order. However, the attempt to totally rationalize 
every aspect of man's existence became immensely irrational 
with respect to the internal meaning, identity, and loneli-
ness. Today it seems that every area of life is being quan-
tified and in so doing we believe we have arrived at an ex-
planation of a given phenomenon. 
Applications of mathematical structures, nomenclature, 
and symbols may provide an aid to describing a certain event, 
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but this does not explain that event. For example, we may 
choose to "describe" a human sex cell with component proto-
plasm, mitochondria, flagella, and ribonucleicacid (RNA). We 
may "describe" chromosomal patterns and genetic structure. 
However, is it ultimately possible to "explain" why a micro-
scopic cell division, when given time to develop, grows into 
a human being who is the same but different than all othe-r 
living creatures? Typically, a scientific, rational descrip-
tion consists of a linear chain of events, each given a spe-
cial name or symbol. The problem arises when the symbol is 
taken to be the total explanation of the real. 
The present society takes symbols to be real and acts 
accordingly. If we assume bipolarity of man and human beings 
as dynamic, then reality is not explained by symbols which 
are static devices of description. It is misleading to think 
that description is explanation, yet modern society has been 
led to do just that. Replacement of the authentic, dynamic, 
bipolar understanding has been successfully achieved with 
the inauthentic, static, polarized modes of control. It is 
in this type of existence that we find lonely people hammer-
ed into a statically constructed "reality" for the mainten-
ance of order. What is objective and empirically verifiable 
has become for many the truly valid construction of reality. 
A society of people becomes extremely predictable and con-
trollable when their irrational subjectives selves are negat-
ed. Appeals to a high loyalty, tradition, aesthetics, and deep-
ly religious orientations become the focus of castigation. 
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Such beliefs are a threat to those who would maintain power, 
for the persons engaged in unconventional thought and belief 
are less likely to be controlled. 
Thus, the past and the present are not particularly im-
portant in the progression toward Utopia. What is important 
is prediction and control. Given the dynamic nature of man, 
prediction is not well accomplished unless we control man 
first and then predict. Technological society has not left 
man as the controller but as the controlled. Carlyle (1829) 
believes: 
Not the external and physical alone is now managed 
by machinery, but the internal and the spiritual also. 
The same habit regulates not our modes of ac-
tion alone, but our modes of thought and feeling. 
Men are grown mechanical in head and heart, as well 
as in hand. . . . Their whole efforts, attachments, 
opinions, turn on mechanism, and are of a mechanical 
character. . . . Mechanism has now struck its root· 
down into man's most intimate, primary sources of 
conviction; and is thence sending up, over his whole 
life and activity, innumerable stems--fruit bearing 
and poison bearing (pp. 65-67). 
Paul Tillich (1953) sought to elaborate on persons in a 
technical society and their inner struggle against deperson-
alization. He describes the existential approaches of 
Kierkegaard, Neitzche, and Sortie, as they discuss the bi-
polar nature of man. If we consider meaninglessness, power-
lessness, and normlessness as characteristics of the alienat-
ed and lonely person, how has modern society created these 
feelings with the individual? Let us, by way of example, 
take the concepts of beauty and ugliness. These concepts are 
relative in their relationship. That is, what we consider as 
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as beauty is beauty only as a mental construct. Can some-
thing be said to be inherently beautiful or ugly? What is 
beautiful, good, and righteous to one person may be ugly, evil 
and sinful to another. Nonetheless, a man develops agree-
ment realities with others, a consensus about beauty or any 
other numerous constructs. However, agreement reality be-
tween persons consists of an exchange or reciprocity of ideas 
subjective and objective in nature. The concept of happiness, 
like beauty, is derived likewise. In modern society something 
has gone amiss. Beauty and happiness are defined not social-
ly through consensual reciprocity but are defined through ob-
jectification. Such comments as "if I only lived somewhere 
else," "if I only had more money, then I'd be happy," "happi-
ness is a new car," "beauty is designer jeans, Max Factor 
makeup," and so on suggest that the concept of success for 
most is monetary gain. A shift has occurred in the locus of 
meaning from mental socially-derived constructs, consensual 
in nature, to engineered constructs which have their locus 
of meaning external to the individual. Can we avoid a mean-
ingless, lonely existence if our sense of identity and mean-
ings are objectified and rational? If meaning in life is 
placed in material goods, have we not polarized our very own 
dynamic nature, negating or ignoring the alternative pole in 
the dialectic of subjective experience and spiritual or non-
material existence? Again we see the irrationality of ration-
ally seeking to progress to a Utopia by polarized objectivity. 
It is from this standpoint that social change is so crucial 
in the consideration of loneliness. Reich (1970) comments 
on the polarization engineered by a "corporate state" and 
the effects on persons: 
The productive state has demanded output from them 
all their lives, draining them of life, creativity, 
vitality, and never giving them a chance to be re-
newed. Competition has made them fearful and sus-
picious of their fellow man, believing that every 
other man is not a brother but a threatening rival 
with a knife at the throat of his adversaries. Im-
prisoned in masks, they endure an unutterable lone-
liness (p. 165). 
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Man of modern society is driven by an external,objecti-
fied,rational authority. Carihg little about their work or 
uncognizant of their social conditions, modern man exhibits 
a hollow social death. The hierarchical structure of the pro-
ductive state imposes a low self esteem on the individual as 
systems material. Such impositions create a working force 
for the machinery of the state and create a condition of in-
feriority in which the individual is looked down upon by 
society and looks down upon himself because, as Reich (1970, 
p. 42) asserts, he is "not as good as someone more success-
ful." There has been a shift in values of beauty, happiness, 
success, and satisfaction from social agreement consisting 
of internal and external influences to an increase in exter-
nal asocial directives which are marketed. 
After consideration of the development and change that 
has taken place, the conditions of society that are conducive 
to widespread loneliness can be identified descriptively. Im-
portant to this description is the duality of man's existence. 
If the duality of the dialectic, objective-subjective 
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components is denied or polarized (in this case, objectified), 
can there be anything but a meaningless, lonely existence? 
Let us proceed to examine specific areas of modern society, 
their change, development, and the duality denial to persons 
that they impose. 
Industrialization 
It would seem at the center of industrialization there 
lies a series of economic changes, and that the merit of such 
changes are indicated by the growth or progress of the econ-
omy. However, what is also involved in industrialization is 
a vast number of social changes. Associated with this change 
are specific components of the industrial system. Major and 
constantly changing technology means more work is done by 
machines rather than by hand. People's labor is marketed. 
Work is concentrated in single enterprises. A new social 
type emerges, that of enterpreneur (Burns, 1969). Such change 
has brought about urbanization, increased mobility, rational-
ization, secularization, and bureaucratization. To become 
industrialized is supposedly to become rational. The process 
has affected not only public places and work, but relations 
of family, marriage, and personal friendship. 
If we examine the major social institutions of family, 
religion, education, government, and industry, we find that a 
dramatic change has occurred in their interrelationships. 
The family was once primary in its role for survival. The 
other institutions, particularly government and industry, were 
52 
created as secondary agencies to be used as tools for the in-
surance of familial survival. Such institutions were design-
ed and operated by families, for the cooperation and consen-
sus on group policy was critical for survival. There were 
arguments, disagreements, and resolvement. The interaction was 
socially dynamic. In today's society we find that this dyna-
mic has been replaced in the legal-rational systems by a sta-
tic order. All of the major institutions have an asocial 
character to them by inducing chains of rational command based 
on persuasion, command, or coercion. The one remaining group 
that still maintains a somewhat social character is the fami-
ly, but even the family is breaking down because of the rigid 
structured inability of persons to maintain reciprocal social 
relations. How can persons maintain genuine social relations 
when the society they live in has stripped them of input and 
all other areas of life have been quantified, rationalized, 
and bureaucratized. 
The basic survival group, the family, that once created 
the other institutions of religion, education, industry, and 
government to help insure its survival, is now threatened. 
These secondary institutions have become so dominant as to 
diminish the primary family group that first created them. 
Through a process of urbanization, industrialization, and con-
sequential increases in mobility, the family has decreased 
from an extended type to a nuclear family, moving presently 
to a great number of single-parent families. It would seem 
that secondary institutions set in rationalism have become 
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of primary concern, while the family and social interaction 
between persons has become of secondary importance. It is 
almost as if it would behoove us to keep the family organized 
socially, in order to insure the survival of the rational, 
institutional structures. The continued focus on utopic pro-
gress is adversely affecting the family and individuals as 
they find interacting authentically more difficult. They are 
becoming victims of a move much past survival based on "need," 
to domination, competition, power, and exploitation based on 
"want." Slater (1970) admits: 
We talk of technology as the servant of man, but it 
it is a servant that now dominates the household, 
too powerful to fire, upon whom everyone is help-
lessly dependent .... We never ask, for example, if 
the trivial conveniences offered by the automobile 
could really offset the calamitous disruption and 
depersonalization of our lives that it brought 
about. We simply say 'You can't stop progress' and 
shuffle back inside (p. 25). 
While industry has been able to far surpass the material 
needs for survival by offering a wide array of material wants, 
society has paid the price. Rational efficiency and organiz-
ation are very effective in producing materials; however, the 
competition, automation, and rigidity present do not produce 
the psychological (internal) needs of the person. Further-
more, not only are the internal needs lacking--they are de-
pleted. 
Capitalism, communism, imperialism, or whatever label we 
give to rational power structures has little significance, 
except to create in-group/out-group cohesion mechanisms as a 
rationale for more industrialization and military spending. 
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Far from solving man's basic internal needs, alienation and 
loneliness are immeasurably worsened. In liberating man from 
social responsibility based on values and ethics contained 
internally, the external succeeds in creating deep feelings 
of insecurity, powerlessness, doubt, loneliness, and anxiety 
(Fromm, 1941). Rational structures of industry, which dis-
allow the duality of man, condemns the worker to experience 
himself not as a person but as a commodity or object to be 
traded, bought, and sold. The move away from craftsmen to 
specialized functionaries has meant that while rational effi-
ciency is sought~ persons are removed from the creative as-
pects of producing a "whole" product containing personal char-
acteristics of name and design. Quality is negated in the 
name of quantity. This specialization of task prevents per-
sons from having any vested interest in artfully producing a 
"whole" product which will bear their name and reputation. 
Not only are tasks specialized but so too are knowledge and 
the flow of information, as labor is divided and arranged in 
an economic and status hierarchy. 
For Karl Marx, the division of labor was central to the 
process of capitalist industrialization. According to Marx, 
this division,while existing in all societies throughout his-
tory,underwent an immense qualitative change under a capital-
istic orientation (Marx, 1867). The crucial distinction of 
the division of labor systems was in the authority exercised 
over the worker. The social division of labor saw indepen-
dent producers coming together buying and exchanging 
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commodities among themselves, subject to free competition. 
The industrialized division of labor implied an absolute and 
despotic authority of the capitalist over the workers (Kumar, 
1979). In the present historical situation, under capital-
ism our essential being is deprived~-the separation of exis-
tence and essence in the tragic condition of human life in a 
capitalistic society (Quinney, 1980). The contemporary capi-
talistic world is caught in what Paul Tillich--going beyond 
Marx's materialistic analysis of capitalism--calls a sacred 
void, the human predicament on both a spiritual and a socio-
political level (Tillich, 1948). 
The effects of capitalistic industrialization on the 
loneliness of the individual are apparent in the systematic 
separation of man from his nature. Quinney (1980) concurs: 
Among the various characteristics of present civil-
ization are a mode of production that enslaves 
workers, an analytic rationalism that saps the vital 
forces of life and transforms all things (including 
human beings) into objects of calculation and con-
trol, a loss of feeling for the translucence of 
nature and the sense of history, a demotion of our 
world to a mere environment, a secularized humanism 
that cuts us off from our creative sources, a de-
monic quality to our political state, and a hope-
lessness about the future (p. 3). 
Distance and indifference arc found in social interac-
tion, but the competition and mistrust imposed by the indus-
trial/economic system is widely apparent. What are the char-
acteristics of organization people or the industrial man? 
Whyte (1956) has given an in-depth appraisal of the 
"organization man." The paradox of the individual versus 
the collective good is apparent in the corporate philosophy. 
56 
Officially, Americans espouse the Protestant ethic, that is, 
the pursuit of individual salvation through hard work, thrift, 
and competitive struggle. Individualism of personal respon-
sibility for gain is the current rhetoric. Corporate man 
evangelizes individualism while at the same time does not 
realize that the very corporation vested in rational power 
structures is preventing everything except a myopic individu-
alism. Corporations are asocially derived collectives. To 
suggest that industry and corporations are imposed viciously 
as collectives for control is not conceivable to the corpo-
rate executive, though he is engaged in a collective which 
is more detrimental to individualism than any organization 
he may warn against as being subversive (Whyte, 1956). 
The essence of the corporate man and the created state 
is a single homogeneous mind. He has only one mind, one 
value: the value of technology, organization, efficiency, 
growth, and progress. Control and direction of most every-
thing has been turned over to corporate orientations--the 
natural environment, our lives, our minds (Whyte, 1956; 
Reich, 1970; and Quinney, 1980). 
Happiness is a commodity as well as success, love, beauty, 
and most other subjective experiences and values. The idea 
of administration is that the best way to conduct activity is 
the rational control of that activity. The random, irration-
al, and alternative ways of doing things are banished. The 
lonely feelings of emptiness, being out of self-control, and 
loss of identity are not terribly misunderstood if we observe 
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these daily modes of corporate control. It seems endemic 
that the loss of identity leads to escapism in which we seek 
to regain those aspects of ourselves which are creative, span-
taneous,and irrational. Escapism then is a compensatory 
activity against the objective-rational imposition of a car-
porate, bureaucratic structure. Quinney (1980) states: 
True human nature is impossible under the condi-
tions of capitalism, and true humanity can be achiev-
ed only in a protest against this estrangement. 
Human physical existence must be vitalized, and 
spiritual and social life must be restored. The 
ontology of being, in fact, moves us to continually 
inquire into the meaning of our social existence 
and to question the estrangement of this existence 
from our essential being (p. 4). 
Through the overrationalization within corporate struc-
tures maintained by the major social institutions, it is im-
possible to close the separation between existence and essence 
or create a reality in which a human "wholeness" is more ful-
ly realized (Quinney, 1980). Though human action is undaunt-
ed by total rationality, we may find the unity of production 
and product, subject and object, and spirit and matter. It 
is not unusual that more individuals are finding escape neces-
sary. 
There has been a recent shift in the move back to rural 
areas in terms of vacation places and a second house. That 
is, families are working in a metropolitan area, then traveling 
during "time off" to less dense areas for recreation. This 
move is predominantly characteristic of the more affluent who 
maintain employment in an urban industrial are while maintain-
ing a weekend or summer retreat. But if one has not the means 
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to leave the metropolitan area, the need to escape is still 
present. Drug use is prevalent in all areas and social 
classes. The use of amphetamines and barbiturates, with the 
accompanying addiction, are the most used drugs in America. 
The addicts tend to be middle and upper class professionals 
(Hill,19 ). If we consider alcohol, caffeine, and tobbaco 
use, drug usage is alarming at all social class levels. 
But is it the drug use that is the problem or the need 
to escape from an overly rationalized life? If we are afflu-
uent, we may have a boat, an airplane, or a place in the coun-
try for weekends _including a fully stocked bar. If we are 
not so affluent, we may have a six pack of beer, a "joint" of 
marijuana, or various pharmaceutical means of escape in the 
mind without a change of surroundings. To drastically change 
one's surroundings for the purpose of escape is costly. We 
see that both legal and illegal activities, as well as social-
ly accepted or rejected behaviors, are not the issue nor is 
the increased policing of activity. What becomes the issue 
is the increasing need of persons to escape. The mode of 
escape, it would seem, is dependent on our economic status. 
Has corporate rationalism had a determining role in the loss 
of identity? Reich (1970) provides us with an in-depth 
analysis of the corporate state, explaining the modern soci-
ety of objectified rationalism is: 
a society which is entirely indifferent to human 
needs and values,which can be wholly irrational, 
which can indeed make destructive war on its own 
people. What medium could possibly furnish a way 
for human needs to emerge so distorted and ignored 
and yet keep the people believing that it was 
'their' society? . . . Law is such a medium .. 
that is capable of being wholly external to the 
self .... When law is employed to serve the 
Corporate State, the people do not know what has 
been done to them for law gets into the individu-
al's mind and substitutes its external standards, 
whatever they may be, for the individual's own 
standards (p. 138). 
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The control in the corporate state is not as much a mat-
ter of consensus versus conflict as it is controlling every 
waking hour with rigid rationality. The greater the number 
of laws the greater the resulting discretion, and the more 
lawless the official part of the state becomes. Yet we have 
more laws not to control crime but to maintain the illusion 
of rationality in a state that is irrational in its control. 
How can it be rational when it disallows a whole series of 
diverse, "apparent," irrational behaviors that are socially 
constructed or a reaction to rational constraints which have 
not been socially derived? 
In a society which is based on rational construct dis-
allowing human duality, we are confronted with industry and 
technology wearing the robes of egotistical godhood. That is, 
the environment to which man is an integral part has become 
not a cooperative system for survival but an engineered ex-
plaited entity for man's insatiable competitive wants. Here 
the reciprocity has been lost, and a power relationship of 
man's technology and industry seeks to rationally control 
the environment. The power control for profit has extended 
into this area no less than every other aspect of man's exis-
tence. But what happens when we separate man from his nature, 
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controlling every aspect of his physical surroundings? The 
problems of identity and loneliness are likely to occur. We 
have created for man a lifestyle of objective sterility. 
Even the dislike for nature in general becomes apparent. As 
long as the problems of our existence in relation to nature 
are removed from our immediate field of vision, we assume 
they do not exist. Slater (1970) calls this the "Toilet 
Assumption." Rational structures have the notion that the 
unwanted matter, unwanted difficulties, complexities, and 
obstacles will disappear if they are removed from sight. 
Consider prisons, the aged, the mentally disturbed, or the in-
firm. If we keep these people out of sight, our rational 
structure can maintain its control for the irrationality 
will not be detected. Slater (1970) explains: 
We don't connect the trash we throw from the car 
window with the trash in our streets, and we assume 
that replacing old buildings with new expensive 
ones will alleviate poverty in the slums. . . . The 
result of our social efforts has been to remove 
the underlying problems of our society farther and 
farther from daily experiences and daily conscious-
ness, and hence, to decrease, in the mass of popula-
tion, the knowledge, skill, and motivation to deal 
with them (pp. 21-22). 
Here we see the separation that exists between man as 
producer and consumer, responsible for his own waste, cooper-
ating with the ecology that supports him, and finding meaning 
in a natural environment. To cooperate with nature goes 
against the precepts of a rational control, for this control 
must be one-sided, profit seeking, and competitive. Hardin 
(1968) explains the result of a rationalized, competitive 
system on the environment in an essay entitled "The Tragedy 
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of the Commons." Because each individual desires to better 
their life situation in terms of material goods, they con-
tinue to consume more and more of the earth's resources. The 
problem is that if each person, being "rational," seeks to 
maximize his/her gain simultaneously without limit, the limit-
ed resources of the earth will be depleted, thus destroying 
life. An economic system that is based on the freedom of 
maximum gain for all will bring "tragedy to all" (Hardin, 
1968). This rational orientation disallows the cooperative 
reciprocating duality in nature, compounding the problem of 
denying the dual~ty to exist in man's mind. Instead of giv-
ing back to nature in equal proportion that which we take, 
we competitively take resources (maximize gains) and reim-
burse nature with little or nothing (minimize costs). 
If the static rationalism of control does not begin to 
strive for a more equal position of dynamics, the consequence 
is destruction of the very life support system. Rodale (1972) 
has maintained that the rational man-made system is overly 
simplified and not self-sustaining (Figure 5). How can they 
be? Profit and control for power do not permit it. Profit 
can only be had by taking more and giving less. In recipro-
cal relations which take into account the duality of nature, 
each participant in an interaction gain and lose by interde-
pendency (dynamics). To maintain a rational order, one par-
ticipant must be dependent while the participant in the 
power position commands. Leopold (1949) discussed this con-
cept: 
Dynamic 
Natural Ecosystem: Pond, Marsh, 
Grassland, Forest, Etc. 
1. Captures, converts, and stores 1. 
energy from the sun. 
2. Produces oxygen and consumes 2. 
ban dioxide 
3. Produces carbohydrates and pro- 3. 
teins; accomplishes organic syn-
thesis. 
4. Filters and detoxifies pollutants 4. 
and waste products. 
S. Is capable of self-maintenance 5. 
and renewal. 
6. Maintains silence. 6. 
7. Maintains beauty if not exces- 7. 
sively disturbed. 
8. Creates rich soil. 8. 
9. Stores and purifies water. 9. 
Static 
Man-Made System: House (Conventional), 
Factor, Parking Lots, Etc. 
Consumes energy from fossil or nuclear 
fuels.·· 
Consumes oxygen and produces carbox 
dioxide. 
Cannot accomplish organic synthesis; pro-
duces only chemical degradation. 
Produces waste materials which must be 
treated elsewhere. 
Is not capable of self-maintenance and re-
newal. 
Usually creates noise. 
Usually causes unsightly deterioration if 
not properly engineered and maintained. 
Destroys soil. 
Often contributes to water pollution and 
loss. 
10. Provides wildlife habitat. 10. Destroys wildlife habitat. 
Figure 5. Natural Dynamic Systems Compared to Unnatural Static Systems (Rodale, 1972) 
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There is as yet no ethic dealing with man's rela-
tion to land, and to the animals and plants which 
grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus's slave-girls, is 
still property. The land relation is still strict-
ly economic, entailing privileges but not obliga-
tions (p. 201). 
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The ecological problems that have become existent as man 
has been separated from nature, as well as the escapism previ-
ously discussed, are the by-products of industrial and techno-
logical manipulations. The by-products, and they are many,are 
the symptoms of the overrationalization of social life. It 
becomes apparent that a rational progress toward Utopia is 
terribly irrational, especially if the progress is destroy-
ing the very systems that support it. The social bond, pri-
mary reciprocal relations, and the environment (dynamic rela-
tionships) are negated. 
Bureaucratization 
The mechanism of the rational philosophy which enforces 
the control and subsequent duality breakdown in individuals 
is bureaucracy. We previously discussed the characteristics 
of the legal-rational system (Weber, 1922) in our section on 
industrial change and the separation of man's duality. Let 
us discuss more specifically the characteristics of the power 
structure that has radically altered government, industry, 
education, religion, and most importantly, the family. It is 
the position of this author that alienation, identity prob-
lems,and loneliness have become pervasive as rational systems 
continue to disallow man's irrational subjective experience 
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There is no profit in this nor is control externally imposed 
as a viable mechanism of power. Urban areas which are char-
acterized by specialization through rational legitimized 
rule have developed "specialized" knowledge. But the price 
of this increase in specialization is a breakdown in social 
communication. Complex differentiation, specialization of 
knowledge, and work diminish the possibilities for enlighten-
ed communication among the generally educated. Conversation 
becomes a lost art, diminishing the prospect of spiritual 
community (Roszak, 1973). 
Bureaucratization refers to changes in the various or-
ganizations of society toward rationality. This ideally 
means improving efficiency and more effective attainment of 
common goals (Etizen, 1974). The term "common goals" is 
questionable, when the flow of information and ideas is only 
in one direction--top to bottom. The so-called common goals 
have been engineered, as well as the fulfillment of those 
goals. Such a power structure is asocial with respect to re-
ciprocal social interaction. The dynamics of reciprocity be-
tween internal loci of meaning and external loci of structur-
al constraints is thrown out of balance so that all meaning 
which is considered to be valid is externally imposed. 
Eitzen (1974) believes that participation is based on 
fear, not loyalty. This is not surprising with the bureau-
cratic structure. Loyalty develops through dynamic social 
interaction, while fear is derived through static relation-
ships based on the power stratum, the dominant to the 
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submissive, and the chain of legitimized commands. Through 
a process of bureaucratization the major social institutions 
that once maintained some plurality for the separation of 
power, as a check and balance system, have had their ideologies 
homogenized. By structuring society in a legal-rational 
framework, emphasis is diverted from personal meaning (content) 
and shifted to policy adherence, record keeping, and the appear-
ance of order (form). 
The loneliness that individuals feel in society is brought 
about then by the formalness of social relations. The strict 
adherence to rul~s,impersonal justice, and segmented relations 
ignores and disallows meaningful relations, the expression of 
emotions, caring of and being cared for by others (recipro-
city). 
The family group, though stark in its resistance to for-
mal rational constraints, finds itself presently in danger. 
One need only look at divorce rates, child and spouse abuse, 
and marital discord. Bureaucracy has the effect of increas-
ing its influence on the family to the point of diminished 
cooperation replaced by competition between children and 
spouses, overly authoritative handling of children, rigid role 
structures. The consideration of persons as whole entities, 
dynamic in nature, has been replaced with myopic role defini-
tions based on externally imputed "shoulds" and "should nots." 
This is not to denute role construction socially created and 
maintained. However, many roles are not created through an 
exchange but through a passive conformity to rational 
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constructs and "mass media" mentality. Since individuals 
are alone, in terms of not being a "whole" person but a role 
in a viable group, they are much more susceptible to manipu-
lation by the powerful. The mass media is an important tool 
for manipulation of the mass society. Examples of such con-
trol are numerous. Particularly good is The Selling of the 
President (McGinnis, 1968). 
Hierarchies declare that as workers, most men and women 
must accept absolute authority and superiority of someone 
"above" them. The boss is not only empowered to tell a worker 
how to perform the work; the boss is also treated as a higher 
form of human being. Comments are made of the "childishness" 
of the average adult in America. Bureaucracy not only con-
vinces persons of their dependence, but demands dependence 
and childishness by the wholesale turning over of responsi-
bility and self-respect to someone in authority (Rice~ 1970). 
The mechanism of bureaucratization for the achievement 
of social organization through efficiency on a massive scale 
cannot be deemed totally evil. Bureaucracy is efficient at 
handling many routine and predictable problems. The question 
of legal-rational structures is not one of all or nothing. It 
is a question of the balance of that structure which will 
allow for individual dynamics and input. If the patterns of 
social behavior have been altered to the point that behavior 
is externally engineered for systems maintenance only, here 
is a shortcoming. The polarization of any form of control 
(external) to the extent that all other so called "contrary" 
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forms are diminished or extinguished results in the loss of 
a person as a dynamic social being. Meaningless, powerless-
ness, felt isolation, and loneliness will continue to remain 
persistently a problem on a massive scale. 
Secularization 
Among various types of social change there is the change 
that took place within the religious institutions. It is im-
portant to examine the move from sacred orientations to sec-
ular orientation (Becker, 1932) as we investigate loneliness, 
for the religious institutions are so often thought as impor-
tant to the meaning and subjective experience of people. 
During the middle ages, roughly from 1200 A.D. until 
1450 A.D., society, which had been typically structured around 
the Roman Catholic ehurch, rebelled against central domination. 
According to Brinton (1960) secularization began to occur 
during this period: 
The late fifteenth, the sixteenth, and the seven-
teenth centuries are viewed as essentially tran-
sitional, essentially years in preparation for 
the Enlightenment. In this transition, humanism 
Protestantism, and rationalism (the natural sci-
ences) do their work of undermining the medieval, 
and preparing for modern cosmology (p. 27). 
Increasing numbers of people were engaged in commerce. 
Such commerce was developed by networks globally, giving rise 
to inflated profits and easy wealth. Knowledge in all areas 
began to be assembled, classified, and made available. Phi-
losophy began to view man as competitive by nature for honor 
and profit (Spann, 1950). 
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In the latter part of the seventeenth century, under 
pressure from new commercial and intellectual interests, re-
ligion was moving out of the foreground as a primary explana-
tory technique and being rapidly replaced with other scienti-
fic explanations. Concurrently, churches were moving from 
papal dominance to an increased subjection to the state, pro-
ducing secular trends among the clergy. This appears to be 
the point that religion and secular thought became one, not 
as a synthesis but by the dilution of religious trends into 
state and intellectual conformity. 
The eighteenth century brought about the settlement of 
North America. However, there was such a surge of the new 
development on the American "Frontier" that religion suffer-
ed. America was seeking to control the resources of nature, 
increase industrial power, and further provide new technology. 
Along with these developments came the growth of commerce, 
the rapid expansion of poorly governed cities, and the acqui-
sition of enormous wealth by a few. In response to business 
and monetary monopoly by a small group, Christianity made 
two major changes. First, there was increased efficiency of 
organization in the churches under the influence of business 
methods and of lay activity in educational and benevolent 
enterprises. Second, it was an era of social gospelers who 
assailed the methods of the plutocrats and implored in the 
name of religion for economic justice and rights of the 
laborer (Sweet, 1948). Conversely, we see that the religious 
institutions were working for the rights of citizens but at 
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the same time they were becoming the same, structurally, as 
the government they sought to confront. As society progress-
ed away from a joint effort of church and state, it took on 
certain characteristics from the resultant secularity. None 
of the basic concerns of man's spirit (subjective reality) 
carried more than an attenuated relationship to religion. A 
unified religious spirit had lost its intensity. The objec-
tive habits of science, the routine character of industry, and 
the mechanistic influence of the machine have all increasing-
ly encouraged the secularization of the West. Work is no 
longer surrounded by ritualism with religious connotations. 
The dance, song, and community spirit of work have been delet-
ed, leaving only drudgery in sight. 
Secularization, according to Martin (1978), had a corro-
sive impact on visible religion consisting of two phases: 
The first phase left all kinds of human scale struc-
tures standing: the family firm, self-employment, 
the small farm, the small office, the intimate col-
lege, and pockets of community, either rural organ-
ized around the church or industrial organized 
around the kinship network. All these were congru-
ent with a family model of society where individuals 
mattered in relation to a constraining structure 
which could offer meaning (p. 91). 
With the first phase came voluntary associations, life organi-
zations, life organized by national boundaries, and a continu-
ance of homogeneous feelings of brotherhood. The second 
phase of secularization had at its basis a breakdown of tra-
ditional authority with movement into legal-rational struc-
tures (Weber, 1922). As a result of this second phase, the 
human scale structures were broken down and replaced by 
bureaucracies; empathy through mass communication became 
apathy, and the national identity corroded (Martin, 1978). 
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This phase of secularization has three overall aspects 
that tend to be exhibited by society. They are the lack of 
unity (decreased emphasis on generalism and a move toward 
specializatoin), no superstitution (the negative of unseen 
subjectivity), and alienation (meaning and definition loss) 
(Miller, 1963). 
The lack of unity resulted in the consciousness of man 
undergoing a radical differentiation by which the various 
component parts of his psyche "broke loose" and moved into 
an independent freedom. The aesthetic and political sense 
was no longer dominated by religious themes, and reason devel-
oped science and repudiated any authority but truth consider-
ed "objectively." Each stood in diametric opposition to the 
religious unity that had traditionally held them in bounds, 
with the exception of one characteristic: the legal-rational 
structuring for control. Religion, while stressing its oppo-
sition to other social institutions, began to be studied and 
constructed in a polarized,objective position. 
The lack of superstition and mystery is increasingly be-
ing eradicated by the further imposition by science and tech-
nology. We have learned a degree of honesty, how to observe 
objectively, and how to describe more accurately. This acts 
as a check on fears, exaggerations, and projections. However, 
there is a negative repercussion from a swing too far in this 
direction: we accept epistemological constructs that are 
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dependable and repetitive, and reject everything that cannot 
be measured, analyzed, and predicted. Science and the polariz-
ation in the rational pushes away the unmeasurable as unknow-
able, and the sacred-religious is affected by reductions in 
worship as being trite. The negation of metaphysics is a 
dimension of secularization. 
How have counter-religious ideologies been propagated 
so as to remove the importance of religion into an objecti-
fied polarity? The decrease in mystery with advances in tech-
nology undoubtedly played a role in the negation of metaphys-
ical epistemological structures. Where a society dichoto-
mizes content frcim form, retaining only form,we then find 
technique to be more important than basic understanding. In 
every area the symptom of a loss of content is indicated by 
the rise of technique. Techniques for control, manipulation, 
short cuts, speed and efficiency, and mass propaganda are ever 
increasing. Technique is a method employed to reduce the 
content of any reality being dealt with in order to handle 
it quickly. Civilizations that seek to control and efficien-
cy of the society develop similarly until the actions of the 
people are increasingly channeled into routine and habit. In 
science this developed int6 technical research with its ever 
increasing use of symbols taken to be reality. However, de-
scription and labels given to various parts of the natural 
world are not explanation. In institutional religion it is 
exhibited by ecclesiastical secularity which is paramount in 
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"letter of the law religion" for the control of participants 
but lacks the "spirit of the law" (Miller, 1963). 
The objectification of religion for the control of indi-
viduals has its foundations in the Judea-Christian tradition. 
Hierarchies and competition with nature are pervasive in 
Christian doctrine and the perception of diety. Consider 
the following example which contrasts the Tao of oriental 
philosophy with the almighty God of Christian religion: 
In the words of Tao-tzu (Watts, 1972): 
The great Tao flows everywhere to the left and to 
the right. All things depend upon it to exist, 
and it does not abandon them. To its accomplish-
ments it lays no claim. It loves and nourishes 
all things, but does not lord over them. 
On the other hand: 
His eyes were as a flame of fire, and on his head 
were many crowns; and he had a name written, that 
no man knew, but himself. And he was clothed with 
a vesture dipped in blood; and his name is called 
the Word of God .... And out of his mouth goeth 
a sharp sword, that with it he should smite the 
nations: and he shall rule them with a rod of iron; 
and he treadeth the winepress of the fierceness and 
wrath of Almighty God. And he hath on his vesture 
and on his thigh a name written: KING of KINGS, AND 
LORD of LORDS. 
Magnificent as this is, the style is utterly dif-
ferent from the Taoist conception of the monarch, 
who is to: 
Blunt his sharpness; 
Get rid of his separateness; 
Soften his brillance; 
Be even with the dust. 
This is called the profound identity 
For, 
The ruler who wants to be above the people must 
speak of himself as below them. If he wants to be 
ahead of the people, he must keep behind them. 
Thus when the sage is above, the people do not 
feel him as a burden, when he is ahead, the peo-
ple do not feel him as a hindrance (pp. 38-39). 
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Note the extremely different conceptions of diety. The Tao 
seems to be based on cooperation, love, and nourishment. The 
Christian conception is one of "rods of iron," smitten na-
tions, wrath, fire, and fierceness. These differences in reli-
gious orientation toward diety, it would seem, are reflected 
in power positions and the institutional arrangements of 
American society. The control through objectification has 
developed throughout the social ins ti tut ions since the period 
of enlightenment.· 
In this process of social change a controversy exists 
between those who maintain that a power elite are the control-
ling force in the rational power structures or whether upon 
reaching the top of the structure we find nobody is in charge. 
If we maintain that society is controlled by an elite few, 
there is a vested interest in swaying society into control. 
Domhoff (197 4) diagrammatically modeled the transferral of 
power from a minute few elite into secular areas, with ration-
al systems as the mechanism (Figure 6). The control, being 
so subtle and pervasive, is hard to pinpoint·. However, it 
represents a radical shift in the way persons are treated, 
citizens to employer, the state, and institutions, particular-
ly the rational control structures under the guise of religion 
and education. It is a shift from direct to indirect methods 
of control, from moralistic to mechanistic, from hortatory to 
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manipulative (Schrag, 1978). Where society moves out of re-
alism into a world of symbols and nominalism, taken to be 
real, the shift has been made by the controlling ideology. 
The resultant lack of satisfaction, meaning, and identity in 
the use of abstractions as adequate reflections of reality 
account for the glut of imagery for control. When real cur-
rency is scarce, counterfeit will increase without limit. 
Society, increasingly is deprived of profound, authentic and 
truly sacred images, which are socially, not institutionally, 
derived. Yet counterfeit images are abundant (Miller,1963): 
Magazines are now full of pictures instead of words; 
television has taken the place of radio; the church 
world, public relations, social relations and poli-
tics are full of audio-visual aids and manipulated 
insinuations of popular images .... All that once 
was poetry has now been demeaned to assist in selling 
sausage, hair spray and male deodorant, with market 
place control for power the ultimate goal (p. 72). 
Whether we maintain that there is elite control or that 
legal-rational systems have nobody specifically directing 
them, the difficulties of overrationalization and the subse-
quent denial of man as a dualistic dynamic individual still 
remain. 
The impact of secularization is brought into perspective 
if we look at the secular alterations of Christian doctrine. 
Ideally, Christian doctrine expresses the belief in new testa-
ment scripture. According to this idea, Christ himself brought 
a new mode of behavior and example which superseded the old 
testament teachings. Examples such as "do unto others as you 
would have them do unto you" are at the basis of Christianity. 
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Notice the reciprocal, social nature of such a statement. 
Under the guise of religion today we find a shift has occur-
red, expressed by the most prominent leaders of religious in-
stitutions. Ideas of "more punishment for crime" or "more 
law and order" are frequently espoused from the pulpit. These 
ideas have not come from new testament doctrine but from old 
testament doctrine of "an eye for an eye and a tooth for a 
tooth." If Christian religion is indeed new testament ori-
ented, why is the rhetoric of an old testament brand? Reli-
gious institutions clammer about "justice" as the old testa-
ment teachings, but little is said of "mercy" as contained 
in new testament doctrine. The author previously referred 
to this as "the letter of the law" (justice, rational rule) 
and the "spirit of the law" (mercy, subjective feelings). 
Christian religion emphasizes both as a dynamic; secularized, 
institutionalized religion emphasizes only the polarized,sta-
tic concept of "justice." Religion thus has been incredibly 
altered away from the social by institutionalization and me-
chanisms of bureaucracy. 
The thought processes in thinking have polarized in the 
dialectic extremes. Secularization of religion is not ex-
eluded from this polarization. Social change as· character-
ized by rational constructs heretofore have disallowed a 
dynamic form of thinking to continue. According to Chapman 
(1971): 
When a person views the world as a dynamic process 
to be examined from its general aspects to its par-
ticular aspects and from the particular to the gen-
eral by way of a conceptual method of thought, he 
will see it quite differently than when he uses the 
dialectical method of thought where his ability to 
think is severely eroded. This erosion of individ-
ual ability to think from the general to the parti-
cular and from the particular to the general is a 
result in the dialectical method of thought. The 
dialectic has a built-in tendency to shunt thought 
into a polar position where thought and emotion 
rise to guard a vested interest position (pp. 71-
7 2) . 
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Man now finds himself in a polarized existence of ration-
al constructs. Conceptual thinking,as opposed to dialectical 
thought. allows for the dynamic relationship between the poles 
of reality construction, meaning, and identity. The polar posi-
tion of rational constructs exists for modern man as the 
irrational aspects of daily experience are lost. This is not 
due to the nature of reality only being "rational," but the 
weakness in allowing only the rational to be a valid apprais-
al of reality to the exclusion of anything else. 
Social Change and the Polarized Dialectic 
Let us consider the dialectic of man's existence. We 
say that dialectic is a method of considering reality. The 
essence of the dialectic is contradiction; each concept im-
plies its opposite (Turner and Beeghley, 1981). Usually, 
dialectic models consist of ideas as antonyms, that is, oppo-
sites. Dialectical methods usually consist of a thesis, an 
antithesis, and a synthesis. The actual splitting of a con-
cept cannot be done except for the sake of objective analy-
sis. Though, as discussed previously, dialectical methods as 
opposed to conceptual methods usually result in a polarized 
reality construction. The polarization occurs as bipolar 
constructs are collapsed or synthesized into a single pole 
construct (Chapman, 1971). 
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As we try to develop a theoretical model for loneliness, 
it will be necessary to present polar concepts as a mode of 
comparison which reflect the situated rational constructs 
that dominate modern trends. 
Figure 7 contains several polar concepts of man. Is man 
rational or irrational, compulsive or impulsive, objective or 
subjective, structured or unstructured, controlled by external 
locus or internal locus? Several constructs can be included 
in the polar extremes which constitute a duality of existence 
or reality. Horton (1966) has used a similar method in dis-
cussing the differences between assumptions underlying func-
tionalism and conflict theories of sociology. 
Were we to polarize a human being's existence to either 
extreme, would we not negate many aspects of reality as non-
existent or inconsequential? Man's existence is not an 
either-or situation but a "both" existence. Man is a dynamic 
individual. The need for expression, meaning, and social inter-
action relies on the combination of both antithe~ical ex-
tremes. The meaning so often sought lies in the dynamic 
interchange or interdependency of the dual mental constructs. 
Consider Figure 8 below. If a shift is made too far toward 
either static construct, duality of reality has been hampered 
or negated. Man's nature includes all of the constructs from 
both static positions and more. No listing of nominal symbols 
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Static Construct Social Static Construct 
Man's Nature Dynamic Man's Nature 
Rational - - Irrational -
Compulsive .. -Impulsive-Hysterical Objective - Subjective 
Structured .. -Unstructured External locus Internal Locus -of Control - - of Control 
Form 4 -Content Technical - - Theoretical -
Particular - General - -
Predictable Spontaneous 
Mechanical .. • Creative 
Neurotic 4 -Psychotic Over-Conformity - Under-Conformity 
Letter of the Law - Spirit of the Law 
Justice - Mercy 
Logical - Illogical 
Scientific-Seen - Unscientific-Unseen -
Passive Reception Active Input 
"Me" "I" 
Physical - Mental -
Yang • • Yin 
Order-High Order - - Disorder-Low Order 
Rigid - Free-Floating 
Military-Industrial . - Agri-Intense -
Empirical - Abstract 
Polarized Interdependent Polarized 
Homogeneous Reciprocal Homogeneous 




Figure 7. Analytical Constructs 
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can fully characterize the total existence of man. Legal-
rational systems that characterize the major social institu-
tions are anything but dynamically social. Polarization has 
occurred, negating not only the other construct extreme but 
the dynamic position requires that each construct extreme be 
tempered by the other. Without the tempering that provides 
a balance, society in terms of a social dynamic and hetero-
geneous exchange has been homogenized. Feelings of "who am 
I" arise. The complexity of social reality has been reduced 
to a simplistic construct. What better way is there to con-
trol meanings, id~as, beliefs, than by defining the total of 
social reality as a static construct, and by stigmatization 







Figure 8. Dual Mental Constructs 
Where man's existence is viewed as either rational or 
irrational, we find a dialectical conflict with no synthesis 
possible. Figure 9 illustrates the tendency to dichotomize 
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The general or The particular 
The empirical or The abstract 
The map or The territory 
The symbol or The referent 
The thought or The thing 
The construct or Reality 
The concept or The world 
Community or Society 
Ideal or Real 
True or False 
Good or Evil 
Time or Space 
God or Devil 
Life or Death 
Light or Darkness 
One or Many 
Perception or Hallucination 
Form or Content 
Functional or Dysfunctional 
The medium or The message 
Structure or Function 
Conscious or Unconscious 
Rational or Irrational 
Subjective or Objective 
Intrinsic or Extrinsic 
Epistemology or Ontology 
Heredity or Environment 
Nature or Nurture 
Figure 9. Dialectical Conflicts 
82 
and then to embrace one side of the dichotomy to the exclu-
sion of the other or to choose one position in a range of 
possibilities, rejecting the whole range as irrelevant or 
nonexistent. Such is the case with scientific rational struc-
tures which choose a point of reality on an infinite range 
and call it "absolute truth" or "social facts." 
The dialectical synthesis is possible only when man's 
nature is viewed as rational and irrational. Thus, the syn-
thesis will take into account the social dynamic (Figure 9). 
Power to control a large number of people may be usurped by 
eliminating alte~native sources of social attachments and 
beliefs, particularly the subjective aspects (Wrong, 1970). 
The irrationality of a rational system that seeks to main-
tain a rigid chain of static order is described in the fol-
lowing (Kolakowski, 1977): 
Its integration was identical with its disintegra-
tion; it was perfectly integrated in that all forms 
of collective life were subordinated to, and im-
posed by, one ruling center; and it was perfectly 
disintegrated for the same reason: civil society 
was virtually destroyed, and the citizens, in all 
their relations with the state, faced an omnipotent 
apparatus as isolated and powerless individuals 
(p. 285). 
The above description of Stalinism is seen as a totali-
tarian state. By the use of the techniques of persuasion 
and the mechanisms of communications, the social person is 
bereft of social attachements and many times unknowingly 
manipulated by the persons who control power. Whether we 
speak of Communism, Capitalism, Stalinism, or any other 
"ism," where an "omnipotent apparatus" has been elevated to 
total control, the individuals within these systems become 
"isolated and powerless." Jackson (1976) notes: 
One of the principle means used by capitalistic so-
cieties to maintain their exploitation and oppres-
sion of people has been to secure the cooperation 
of different groups of people in oppressing each 
other. This has been done by installing and main-
taining attitudes of racism,prejudice,sexism,and 
adultism between the different sections of the 
oppressed population. Under capitalism the oppress-
ed have to oppose each other. The oppressors are 
not numerous enough; they must deceive the people 
they victimize into doing it to each other (p. 46). 
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The move to a polarized national thought process which 
is then manipulated by those in power for the control of re-
sources has affected through social change the ability of 
the individual to maintain a balanced reality between polar-
ized constructs. Identity and meaning have been hidden from 
view for the purpose of control. Loneliness is a symptom of 
the forced polarization of man against himself. 
Summary 
This chapter has attempted to show through various as-
pects of social change how the duality of man's existence has 
progressively become imbalanced and polarized into the ration-
al. Loneliness, if it is a feeling of loss, isolation,aliena-
tion,and meaninglessness, has a subjective base. If the sub-
jective side of the individual has been progressively negated, 
then a typology of the various types of loneliness can be 
generally described by the focus upon the aspects of that 
negation. 
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In Chapter IV, emphasis will be placed on three general 
types of loneliness: (1) situationally imposed loneliness, 
(2) other imposed loneliness, and (3) self-imposed loneli-
ness or aloneness. The condition (external) and the charac-
teristics of the affected individual (internal) will be pre-
sented. These typologies will not be totally discrete, as 
they vary in magnitude and intensity with each person. 
CHAPTER IV 
A THEORETICAL TYPOLOGY AND 
DESCRIPTION OF LONELINESS 
In this chapter three general types of loneliness will 
be examined: (1) situational or structurally imposed loneli-
ness, (2) other imposed loneliness, and (3) self-imposed 
loneliness or aloneness. 
In order to present the typologies and a subsequent 
model in a meaningful scheme, each typology will be investi-
gated individually. 
The Bipolar Nature of Man 
This author has sought to demonstrate the bipolarity of 
man. The alteration that has occurred through social change 
and institutional structures have and are presently negating 
this dynamic social nature. Such a negation is at the base 
of loneliness. The self is reduced from an "I"-"Me" balance 
to only a receiving "me" (Chapman, 1972). The directives of 
"other" are the only constructs which, given enough power to 
impose, are considered to be valid. 
It was Sorokin (1966) who maintained that sociocultural 
phenomena include the three components of personality, soci-
ety, and culture. These components are dynamic and mutually 
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interdependent. Many sociologists, most notably Parsons (1951), 
have taken these processes and by use of a rational scheme 
have placed them into a "cybernetic hierarchy." When one of 
these component parts is placed artificially into a rational 
hierarchy,the other components are dependent on the one part 
for their reification. The mutual dynamic is thus replaced 
with a static directive. 
Loneliness, alienation, and meaninglessness are results 
of one part of man's bipolar, dichotomous nature being elevat-
ed to perpetual dominance. In this case the logical-empirical 
domination has been elevated to the negation of any other 
social action, thought, or mental construct. 
Situationally-imposed and other-imposed types of loneli-
ness are particularly present as a polarized construct of 
logic,empiricism,overrationalization,and structure are impos-
ed on the individual. Self-imposed loneliness then becomes 
a reaction to the polarized rationalism with a shift to the 
other extreme of irrationalism,structurelessness,nonconform-
ity, and subjectivism, in combination with each other or indi-
vidually. 
Within the framework of Figure 10, situationally-imposed 
loneliness and other-imposed loneliness have been aligned at 
the same pole of the dichotomy, while self-imposed loneliness 
is arranged at the other pole. The question that might be 
raised is, "why are situationally-imposed loneliness and 
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Figure 10. Ideal-Typic Dynamic of Social Action 
Ideally, norms, values, and beliefs are consensually de-
rived through interaction with other social beings (Horton, 
1966). Figure 11 illustrates the dynamic between the self, 
other, and the situation or structure. Observe that others 
constitute the dynamic center of a dichotomy between self 
and structure. Polarization to either extreme results in a 
static interaction,negating the dynamic reciprocity. As 
demonstrated in the discussion of social change, the shift 
has been toward the situation-structural pole for the ration-
al prediction and control of society. The self is thus ne-
gated. The alignment of other-imposed loneliness and situa-
tionally-structurally-imposed loneliness becomes the present-
day model. The position of other-imposed social action has 
moved toward the situationally-structurally-imposed social 
action. 
Others who impose social action and subsequently loneli-
ness do so not out of consensual social reciprocity, as in 
the ideal typic model (Figure 11), but because they them-












Figure 11. Present-Day Polarization 







Imposed Family Structure 
Figure 12. Social and Asocial Familial Structures 
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them. Thus, norms, values, and beliefs become disconsensual. 
What is right, good, or true for others is based on the situa-
tional-structural power directive. What becomes normative 
are those actions and beliefs that are directed by the per-
sons in control of the structure. Castigation,negative sanc-
tions, and coercion are applied to those who would suggest 
and act in an alternative manner to the structural power 
directive. Consider the following example. The family, of 
all groups, should be socially reciprocal. There are few 
persons who would disagree with such a statement, though in 
many instances t~e effects of the structural imposition are 
destroying these bonds. After working in a bureaucratic 
chain of imputed commands during the day, a parent returns 
home only to continue the imposition of directives on the 
family (Figure 12; see page 88). 
The bureaucratic mentality of power directives is pro-
jected into the family structure from the work place. Exter-
nal pressures outside the family thus influence its breakdown 
by introduction of asocial structuring. Primary social rela-
tions, the social bond of interdependence, consequently has 
been progressively negated. The major social institutions 
which were once created to insure survival for the basic 
family organization as secondary tools have become primary, 
leaving the family as secondary. Loneliness, as with other 
major social problems, is a consequential symptom of this 
structural shift in emphasis and hierarchical construction. 
90 
Let us examine the typologies of structurally-situation-
ally-imposed loneliness, other-imposed loneliness, and self-
imposed loneliness. For the sake of clarity each type will 
be described in relation to the social institutions of the 
family, school, religion, government, and industry. The types 
are not meant as totally discrete variables, but as general 
frames of reference for the understanding of loneliness. 
Structurally-Situationally-
Imposed Loneliness 
The descriptive character of the person exhibiting lone-
liness with its roots in the structure and situation can best 
be understood by examining the character of modern industrial 
man and the demands placed on him. Several authors have de-
scribed the modern, industrial man as a "marketing character" 
(Fromm, 1976), the "organization man" (Whyte, 1956), and the 
"corporate man" (Reich,1970). Though the nomenclature varies 
there is a striking similarity in the character traits of 
such persons. 
Fromm (1976) terms modern man as a marketing character 
because this type of person experiences himself as a commod-
ity, and one's value is not "use value" but "exchange value." 
Man has become a commodity on the "personality market." Suc-
cess depends largely on how well persons sell themselves on 
the market; how well they get their "personality" across; how 
nice a "package" they are; whether they are "cheerful," 
"sound," "aggressive," "reliable," "ambitious;" furthermore, 
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what their family backgrounds are, what clubs they belong to, 
and whether they know the "right people." The loss of self is 
insured by the structural constraints of the market. Fromm 
(1976) explains: 
What shapes one's attitude toward oneself is the 
fact that skill and equipment for performing a 
given task are not sufficient; one must be able to 
win in competition with many others in order to 
have success. If it were enough for the purpose 
of making a living to rely on what one knows and 
what one can do, one's self-esteem would be in pro-
portion to one's capacities, that is, to one's use 
value. But since success depends largely on how 
one sells one's personality, one experiences oneself 
as a commodity or, rather, simultaneously as the sel-
ler and the commodity to be sold. A person [in such 
a structure! is not concerned with his or her life 
and happiness, but with becoming salable (p. 133). 
The aim of the marketing character is to completely adapt 
or become infinitely malleable so as to be desirable under 
all conditions of the personality market. This is very much 
like Goffman's dramaturgical model of "life as a con-game" 
(Goffman, 1959). However, does the individual decide to be 
a market personality or does the structure impose overcon-
formity and rationalization on the individual as a prerequis-
ite for success? 
Those under the imposition of the rational structure 
where success is defined as economic security are without 
goals except moving and doing things with the greatest ration-
al efficiency. If asked why they must move so fast, why 
things have to be done with the greatest efficiency, they 
have no genuine answer but offer rationalizations, such as 
"to create more jobs" or "to keep the company growing" (Fromm, 
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1976). The identity and self of such individuals "is" the 
organization. The bipolarity of the self is negated. Ration-
al economic structures become the point of primary validity. 
Little interest is shown in philosophical or religious ques-
tions, such as "where have we come from," "why am I living," 
or "why am I going this direction rather than another." Yet 
though such questions are rarely asked, the inner-self, bi-
polar in nature, responds to the forced polarization of the 
self by the structure with symptoms of stress, nervous break-
downs, heart ailments, or ulcers. Other responses to the 
structural impositions are escapism in fantasy, television, or 
more deleteriously, drugs and alcohol. As the constraints 
of the rational structuring of society increase, the need for 
outlets of escape will also probably increase. For persons 
to retain a balanced self, a compensation must be made for 
the impositions of the legal-rational structures. Emotional-
ism, irrational thought, creativity, and fantasy, by whatever 
means will be a necessary outlet for the balancing of the self. 
The "irrational" emotions which are old fashioned do not 
fit well into the scheme of selling and exchanging or have no 
function according to the logic of the machine of which they 
are a part. The question for the structure to impose is "how 
well do you function?" bestowing advancement in the bureau-
cracy on those who function best by structural definitions. 
The self under such circumstances can only become alienated, 
existentially wanton, and lonely. Schweitzer (1923) explains: 
Because society with its developed organization 
exercises a hitherto unknown power over man, man's 
dependency on it has grown to a degree that he 
almost has ceased to live a mental [geistig] 
existence of his own. Thus we have entered a 
new Middle Ages. By a general act of will freedom 
of thought has been put out of function, because 
many give up thinking as free individuals, and are 
guided by the collective to which they belong . 
. . . With the sacrifice of independence of thought 
we have - how could we be otherwise - lost faith 
in truth. Our intellectual - emotional life is 
disorganized. The overorganization of our public 
affairs culminates in the organization of thought-
lessness (p. 24). 
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So irrational is the total rationalization of existence 
by structural imposition that characteristics of alienation, 
identity problems, and loneliness may become and are a ration-
al response. The paradox of such responses is that modern 
man sets out on an endless search, it would seem, for identity 
and awareness of self-thinking, all the while believing that 
such is to be found through more conformity, more competition, 
more economic gain, and by subjugation to the structural im-
positions of a rational power scheme. By analogy the closer 
modern man perceives the butterfly of self-identity to be, 
the farther it has flown away, for the butterfly dangles on 
a structural string of greed and power for profit and control. 
Could modern man be such a masochist for a structural 
sadism? Masochistic strivings appear as inferiority, power-
lessness, and individual insignificance. The compulsive,neu-
rotic,overconformer is basically of a masochistic type (Reich, 
1933; Horney, 1956; Horkheimer, 1936). The sadism within the 
structure is a characteristic of the same masochist at vary-
ing times. Three aspects of sadism are: (1) to make others 
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dependent on oneself and to have absolute and unrestricted 
power over them; (2) the impulse not only to rule over others 
in an absolute fashion, but to exploit them, use them, steal 
from them, to "disembowel" them, and, so to speak, to incorpo-
rate anything eatable in them; and (3) to make others suffer 
or to see them suffer (Fromm, 1941). The sadist needs the 
person over whom he rules, since his own feeling of strength 
is rooted in the fact that he is master over someone. Both 
masochistic and sadistic feelings tend to help the individu-
al to escape his unbearable feelings of loneliness, aloneness, 
and powerlessnes~. The cycle is vicious, for by increasing 
masochism and sadism, the individual,while "feeling temporari-
ly secure," has moved farther from self-identity,which in 
turn will give use to new strivings for masochism and sadism, 
for security, and so on. Thus, in a rational power structure 
the superior in the work place, for example, gives a command 
(sadism) to a subordinate (masochism) who in turn gives a 
command (sadism) to his subordinate (masochism). The whistle 
blows to end the day; each participant in the structure re-
turns home and demands (sadism) that the spouse and children 
subordinate (masochism) to them. Furthermore, the children 
must find a subordinate for the chain of sado-masochism to 
continue; consequently, they "kick the dog." This is parti-
cularly descriptive of the means by which a bureaucratic 
power structure is continually infesting the primary survival 
group, the family, to its demise. The sado-masochism inher-
ent in a power structure, which maintains a chain of command, 
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forces the surrender of one's own self and renounces all 
strength and pride connected with the self. In such total 
dependency, one loses one's integrity as an individual and 
surrenders freedom; but one gains a new security and a new 
pride in the participation in the power in which they are 
submerged. The benefit is "security" against the torture of 
doubt (Fromm, 1941). Yet in this position the loss of iden-
tity, pride, and moral responsibility are consequential. The 
moral responsibility is to the maintenance of the organiza-
tion. 
The rationalization of the individual whose self has 
been negated by the structure lies in attributing human char-
acteristics to the structure. According to Whyte (1956), the 
pressures of society have been morally legitimated against 
the individual because of three propositions accepted in 
modern thought: a belief in the group as a source of crea-
tivity, a human's ultimate need to "belong," and the applica-
tion of science to achieve human belongingness. 
Creativity and belongingness may, in fact, be essential 
for man; but the belief that scientifically rationalized 
structures can be a greater sum than its constituent parts, 
the individual's, negates the uniqueness and identity of 
each person. To manipulate persons scientifically in order 
to achieve creativity and belongingness is a contradiction 
in terms. Unlike the rational structuring of science, crea-
tivity and belongingness are socially derived through ration-
al and irrational means. 
In The Greening of America, Reich (1970) presents us 
with a picture of man's development through consciousness 
levels. The "corporate man" is described as believing: 
that the present American crisis can be solved by 
greater commitment of individuals to the public 
interest, more social responsibility by private 
business, and, above all, by more affirmative gov-
ernment action--regulation, planning, more of a 
welfare state, better and more rational administra-
tion and bureaucracy. . . . Behind a facade of op-
timism there is a profoundly pessimistic view of 
man (p. 70) . 
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The "pessimism" is revealed by the continued Hobbesian 
notion that since man is aggressive, power seeking, and compe-
titive,that he must be controlled. However, the very struc-
tures that strive in this endeavor are the genesis of much of 
the existing aggression and power seeking. Insistence is 
made that what man produces by means of reason--the state, 
laws, technolog~ manufactured goods--constitutes the true 
reality. What is good,moral,and justice are those polarized 
concepts of reason, the rational, the empirical, the structured, 
and the bureaucratic. The central ideology of these struc-
turally-situationally-imposed directives is one of techno-
logy, the domination of man and environment by technique. Sci-
ence, technology, organization, and planning are of prime impor-
tance. The question is not one of cooperation but of control 
by structural technique. Nor is it a question of mutual in-
terdependence,which allows the self to develop, but exploita-
tion for power and material acquisition by the systematic 
imposition of power directives. Though the structure is, 
ideally, rational and logical, human existence cannot be 
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supported on the basis of any single principle such as this 
demands (Reich, 1970). 
This one-dimensionality (Marcuse, 1964) that the ration-
al structure demands, imposes an existence of "security," 
"logic," and "belongingness." Though many persons involved 
with these structures speak of group efforts and goals, the 
mind is not fooled. The symptoms of man as "structural mate-
rial" are ulcers, stress, high blood pressure, alienation, and 
loneliness. But when questioned about such ailments,particu-
larly loneliness,the individual denies fear, separation from 
self, and isolation within a group of people. People believe 
their identity to be within the conforming behavior to the 
single-minded corporate state (Reich, 1970) ~ Surely physi-
cal ailments would indicate that the demands of the structur-
al corporate state are negating the basic identity needs of 
the individual. It seems to be in the quiet hours of self-
reflection that such persons ask,"What is happening to me?" 
or "What am I doing?" More often the conclusion is that the 
person cannot cope. However, sometimes the conclusion is 
that the structural impositions have forced one to negate 
oneself for the control of one's faculties. This may explain 
the executive who materially has everything and suddenly 
realizes he has nothing. Such a dilemma is illustrated by 
Robinson (1956) in a poem entitled "Richard Cory": 
Whenever Richard Cory went to town, 
We people on the pavement looked at him: 
He was a gentleman from sole to crown, 
Clean favored, and imperially slim. 
And he was always quietly arrayed, 
And he was always human when he talked; 
But still he fluttered pulses when he said, 
'Good Morning,' and he glittered when he walked. 
And he was rich - - yes, richer than a king- -
And admirably schooled in every grace: 
In fine, we thought that he was everything 
To make us wish that we were in his place. 
So on we worked, and waited for the light, 
And went without the meat, and cursed the bread; 
And Richard Cory, one calm summer night, 
Went home and put a bullet through his head 
(p. 19). 
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The discrepancy that occurs between the life we desire 
and the life we actually experience brings anxiety and lone-
liness to our existence. It seems that we always want some-
thing that we do not have. But this lack of contentment 
with one's existence is a demand imposed upon us. The struc-
ture of captialisrn must instill these desires constantly for 
the continuity of control and ideological self-perpetuation. 
This is basic to the "marketing character," the Corporate 
Man, the lonely alienated person who supposes that self-
definition and acceptance is always just ahead as long as he 
remains rationally tied to the structure-logic. 
Consider the factory worker who has developed a recip-
rocal friendship among his peers on the assembly line. He 
is chosen to be the new foreman over those he had worked 
alongside for several years. He has faithfully served the 
organization where he is employed. Through organizationally 
defined merit, he has been chosen to oversee those he played 
poker with on Friday nights, went bowling with on Monday 
nights, and with whom he interacted during his off-work hours. 
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However,the organizational placement affects his informal 
life style. With more money he may move to another area of 
town, express contempt for those who were once close friends, 
and find that new "friends" are made only at the same level 
as his--that of foreman. He finds himself with less off-work 
friends, except those who occupy the same positions organiza-
tionally defined. What were once unbreakable bonds of com-
radeship are now loosened. The primary reciprocal interac-
tion socially derived has thus been superseded by the second-
ary linear directive asocially constructed by the organiza-
tion. This is not without severe costs, for the person has 
vested more of an identity into the power structure of the 
organization. Role demands are set which disallow for social-
ly derived bonds of interaction. Loneliness is endemic to 
America, because the institutions and their organization de-
mand the very homogeneous values, beliefs, and actions that 
insure the loss of self by redefining for the individual what 
in "reality" constitutes the "true self." 
Structurally-Situationally-Imposed Lone-
liness and Social Institutions 
The family is a social institution which by its very 
existence and processes insures the survival of the larger 
society. Members of the family group are bound by a loyalty 
to cooperate and assist each other and to place each other's 
interests above those of outsiders (Linton, 1936). Mutual 
interdependence,adjustment,deliberation,and resolve are tied 
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together by bonds of affection and common interest. The 
structure of the family is not one in which the heads of a 
household are always dominant or rigid but flexible, accommo-
dating themselves to the most timid thoughts, acts, and emotions 
of each member of the family, especially those members most 
helpless and needy (Chapman, 1972). 
The structural-situational impositions on the family 
group force this accommodating reciprocity between family 
members to crystallize into rigid linear chains of power re-
lations. As was described earlier (Figure 12), the influence 
of the structure external to the family has become increas-
ingly imposing so as to break down the social dynamics of 
accommodation and sensitivity into inflexibility and rigid-
ity between family members. Families thus begin to take on 
the characteristics of the organization. Mistrust replaces 
trust, competition replaces cooperation, insatiable want re-
places contentment. The structural-situational impositions 
of institutional organization have taken personality and con-
gealed it into a resource for systems needs of money. Every 
action and thought not needed by the system is repressed 
anew in each newborn child (Chapman, 1972). 
Under such conditions the social process has been trans-
formed into a hierarchy of rational rules for legitimate 
power. To define legitimate as only being that which is ra-
tional within the organization destroys the social process 
not only between individuals in the family group, but within 
each of their minds. The development of the self into its 
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totality is disallowed. Many of the tensions that arise be-
tween parents, parents and siblings, and among the siblings 
are coming into the family group from the external structures 
in terms of job pressure, mass media and consumerism,economic 
pressures, and discrepancies between externally imposed "life" 
(actual) versus desired life. The family group nonetheless 
is still struggling to maintain its socially cohesive exis-
tence. However, over the past 75 years we have seen a change 
from extended families to nuclear families and presently many 
single-parent families. 
The depriva~ion of self from man begins, to its fullest 
extent, as institutionalized training begins in the public 
school. The object of training is not only to teach one how 
to perform some specific function; it is to make one become 
that function; to see and judge himself and others in terms 
of functions; and to abandon any aspect of self, thinking, 
questioning, feeling, or loving that has no utility for pro-
duction or consumption in the corporate state (Reich, 1970). 
The training for a job within the structure of rational 
bureaucracy is just as important as the training for the 
role of consumer within the structure. Both are equally im-
portant for the "loss of self." 
While learning to become an economic citizen who pro-
duces and consumes, the young person is taught about making 
a pseudo-self. That is, a self which will minimize the pun-
ishment of the organization and maximize the rewards of the 
corporate structure. What is moral and ethical is the 
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ability to economically manipulate others and the position 
one achieves in the structural hierarchy. 
The emphasis on position achieved instead of "living as 
a process" constitutes the basic difference between indoc-
trination and education, respectively. Teaching and educa-
tion exist to help students think for themselves. Instruc-
tion and indoctrination are aimed at compelling the student 
to accept someone else's ideas or version of the "facts." 
Whenever a bad mark can be given for disagreement, indoctrin-
ation occurs through behavior modification techniques. This 
author recalls a _particular English class in which the stu-
dents, myself included, were asked to read a poem by Robert 
Frost. Subsequently we were to write down our interpretation 
of the poem or "What does Robert Frost mean and what is he 
saying in this poem?" The class worked furiously to inter-
pret Frost. Upon turning in the essays we were informed that 
there was a "right way" and a "wrong way" to interpret the 
poem. The right way was, of course, the way in which the in-
structor interpreted the poem. The essays not paralleling 
this position received a low mark. To this day this author 
wonders how that instructor knew any better what was on 
Frost's mind than any other person in the class whose inter-
pretations held proportionately as much validity. The in-
structor's knowledge of Frost's mind was accurate, because 
the institution had granted him authority that made it so. 
This is only an example, but the number of like examples is 
endless within the institutional training of the young 
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person to fulfill the role and join the ranks of the ration-
al structures. 
Constant emphasis on externally defined "success" in 
terms of status, material possessions, and acceptability by 
others are key elements in training the young person to value 
structurally imposed constructions of reality. Good and bad, 
right and wrong ways of behaving are defined by external 
policy commands (law, mass media, rules) in which there is no 
allowance for questioning or social bargaining. While it is 
important for persons to learn concepts of good and bad, the 
difference lies ~n the structure imposing one idea of "good" 
or "right" and disallowing the social, dynamic construction 
of reality to occur between persons which is at constant 
change and tension over time. Rational structures are resis-
tant to change, statically maintaining their control. Human 
beings are forced to adapt to the institution for its needs, 
instead of the institution adapting constantly to human needs. 
Thus, self-identity moves away from the generic social 
level of person-to-person, and becomes a relationship of man 
to merit, man to machine, man to ideology, and man to tech-
niques of economy and external directives asocially imputed 
(Chapman, 1972). The idea of critical thought to students 
is alien. If asked to complete a summary of readings or to 
reiterate material assigned for reading, the task is carried 
out with relative ease. However, when asked to read an arti-
cle and then critique the same or to write a five-page paper 
expressing their opinion on a given topic, one is quick to 
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observe that this is a foreign idea. Most students have not 
actively expressed themselves but have passively absorbed 
and regurgitated information. They are victims of indoctrin-
ation, not education. Creativity has been stifled as well 
as those aspects of the self not suitable for systems needs. 
The self now dissected responds with feelings of alienation, 
loneliness, worthlessness, and fear. The paradox of this struc-
tural-situational imposition is that for most, efforts are 
made to carry out tasks more quickly with more efficiency, 
increasing their conformity and obedience to the demands 
placed on them. However, the circle becomes vicious, for the 
more their definition of self parallels the "imposed" self, 
the more they have negated the unique aspects of their gener-
ic "social" self. 
The imposition of authority, indoctrination, and training 
is not the most terrible aspect of the ins ti tut ion; it is the 
result of such domination. Consequently, as Reich (1970) ex-
plains, there is: 
an all-out assault upon the newly emerging adoles-
cent self. The self needs, above all, privacy, lib-
erty, and a degree of sovereignty to develop .... 
The school is a brutal machine for destruction of 
the self controlling it,heckling it,hassling it 
into a thousand busy tasks, a thousand noisy groups, 
never giving it a moment to establish a knowledge 
within (p. 150). 
For social survival the institution of education has the 
universal social function of socialization (Young and Mack, 
1959). But socialization implies reciprocal exchange, growth 
of self, abilities to consider, think, and observe. What passes 
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for education is not socialization at all but "structuraliza-
tion": it disallows important aspects of self to emerge, par-
ticularly if such aspects promote reconsideration of existing 
institutional "givens," imply change, or constantly question. 
After all, the self and consequently persons at the generic 
social level are not so easily given in to follow nor are 
they easily controlled where all aspects of self-identity 
exist. 
In Chapter III, we discussed secularization and social 
change. The structural-situational imposition of institu-
tionalized relig~on may be doing more to create a loss of 
self than gain self-identity; furthermore, it may instill 
"church- ism" but not re 1 igion. Religion is span taneous, per-
ennial, and a universal attribute of man arising from man ex-
periencing uncertainty, insecurity, incompletion, and concern 
about the unknown and unexplained aspects of life (Chapman, 
1972). A religious belief is a personal relationship between 
the person and some form of <lei ty or supreme being. Each 
person religiously interacts with an unseen supreme being or 
force to help resolve doubts,fears,and events which are out-
side scientific logic. 
However, religion has moved out of the traditional realm 
of social life into a structural bantling of economics, bureau-
cracy, and hierarchies of authority and control. "Churchism" 
is the result. Characteristic of "churchism" are congrega-
tions more interested in clothing styles, evening socials, 
attending to their religion not for the sake of religion 
106 
but for the sake of the appearance of religion. To become a 
religious leader in American society does not require a trad-
itional social consensus of religiosity not charisma. It en-
tails the state's magic wand of legitimacy through four years 
of college, a licence, and other secular requirements. Churches 
professing religion have taken on corporate structures,money-
gathering schemes through television, radio, and publications. 
With the exception of a few small sects, most denominations 
parallel the structure of the corporate state. For many, re-
ligion is "churchism" wound up on one day of the week with 
all the pomp and form of an executive corporate meeting. In-
cluded are discussions of budget, agendas, fund raisers, and 
how to bring others into the structural fold. Could it be 
that a deeply religious person with a self-felt social inter-
action with a supreme being would feel alienated, lonely, per-
ceive fakery amidst the ranks of the church goer. If the 
institution of religion has been constructed so as to impose 
a meritocracy, a hierarchy, and has aligned itself with the 
ideology of industry and government which it originally 
sought to oppose, then institutionalization exposes the 
church to be the corporate bantling as it really exists. 
Loss of self,worthlessness,low self-esteem are insured by 
one-way proscriptions. Anderson (1970) describes the alien-
ating contradiction of "churchism" in the following lyric 
entitled "Wind Up": 
When I was young, they packed me off to school 
and taught me how not to play the game. 
I didn't mind if they groomed me for success 
or if they said that I was just a fool. 
So I left there in the morning, with their God 
tucked underneath my arm, 
their half-assed smiles and their ·book of rules. 
So I asked this God a question and by way of 
firm reply 
He said 'I'm not the kind you have to wind up 
on Sundays.' 
So to my old headmaster (and anyone who cares) 
before I'm through I'd like to say my prayers. 
I don't believe you: you got the whole damn 
thing all wrong. 
He's not the kind you have to wind up on Sundays. 
Well you can excommunicate me on my way to 
Sunday school, 
and have all the bishops harmonize these lines. 
H6w do you dare to tell me that I'm my Father!s 
son, 
When that was just an accident of birth 
I'd rather look around me compose a better song 
because that's the honest measure of my worth. 
In your pomp and all your glory you're a poorer 
man than me, 
As you lick· the boots of death born out of fear. 
I don't believe you: you got the whole damn 
thing all wrong. 
He's not the kind you have to wind up on Sundays. 
(Jethro Tull Aqualung) 
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Thus, the move away from a generic social religion to an 
ideal typic rational '~hurchis~'has rendered the survival func-
tion of religion impotent. "Churchism" as a magic show casts 
illusions for those who will lend an ear,play the game, and 
contribute to the plate for future productions. Such is the 
ideology of "churchism." Through this institution comes the 
reduction of protestantism, via Max Weber, to a scheme for 
making money (Gerth and Mills, 1958). The victory of power 
as the value of the ideal type of organization requiring 
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dependency relationships is the stuff "churchism" through in-
stitutionalization is made of. 
The false sense of security provided by rational struc-
tures do more to remove the truly religious away from secur-
ity and identity by polarizing the generic duality of self. 
It is unfortunate that religion is not immune to this kind 
of ideological dissection. Loneliness as imposed by struc-
tural-situational "churchism" is the consequence of rational-
izing the aesthetic. When the vicar exclaims, "Have faith 
in God," maybe he is really saying, "Believe in me and my 
structure, and my version of the story." Such an imposition 
destroys the "wholeness" of man, leaving him as a sponge ren-
dered of all its water, left to dry, and blown by the wind of 
insecurity, isolated in the midst of many, desperate in the 
midst of few. 
The political institution has as its function the pre-
servation of order (Young and Mack, 1959). The rational guar-
antees are constructed to insure that the other social insti-
tutions, namely, the family, the school, the church, and the 
economy are protected in the prerogative to provide the soci-
ety with attributes that insure survival. The political 
state, socially endowed, serves as a system of checks and bal-
ances. However, when the social-political state moves away 
from a social construction into a legal-rational political 
state, it elevates itself above considerations of the social. 
The checks and balances socially derived at the generic level 
are replaced by hierarchical power relations. The welfare 
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of society consequently is now no longer a concern. Power 
and the welfare of power by dominating, impersonal, rational 
rule has become the elevated ideology by which society sub-
scribes (Chapman, 1972). 
The move from social welfare to power welfare, in effect, 
places the other social institutions into a dependency rela-
tionship to the political state. As social survival institu-
tions are not needed, they will be systematically destroyed. 
Subjugation to this elevated legal-rational structuring sepa-
rates man from his self-identity by reification of the social 
self to the legal-rational self. Persons thus are given a 
number, a rank, and the status of systems material. Great care 
is taken to use such ranks and numbers to reward those indi-
viduals who best conform to structural demands. The better 
one prostitutes oneself to the structure in terms of systems 
material, the more likely one is to increase one's status 
within that system. 
Most recently,with the advances in technology and the 
advent of computers, the capabilities of control by surveil-
lance has become a reality (Miller, 1971). Information on 
"character" is constantly being gathered and filed by state 
agencies concerning "cooperation with others," "ethical stan-
dards," "appropriateness of dress," "language and conduct," 
"ability to react constructively to criticism, suggestions, 
advice," "emotional stability." Such "file" materials accu-
mulate through the years as an indicator of how legal-rational 
one has or has not become (Reich, 1970). Problems of self-
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identity, alienation, fear, and loneliness result as such struc-
tural-situational impositions are forced upon the self of 
each person. 
The "good character," as defined by the state, is tense, 
rigid,narrowly limited,specialized,and dependent in fear to 
the state. Competence,worth,esteem,and the ability to cope 
are set into goals which are past- or future-oriented. The 
orientation of the present or "being" is negated along with 
spontaneity and contentment with the present. Life for these 
individuals centers on what has been or what will be instead 
of "being." Thus, the very nature of the legal-rational 
state, by definition of its impositions, is breeding malcon-
tent. For corporation and state rule to perpetuate, it must 
keep the masses under its control as consumers and producers, 
instilling new wants endlessly (Fromm, 1976). 
Never must one be happy with "now." To tolerate the con-
tradictions placed on the self, to tolerate impersonal rela-
tions, inauthenticity, and loneliness, the individual places a 
coating or crust over him/herself. We can see a direct 
parallel between the characteristics imposed by the structur-
al-situational demands and Goffman's (1959) "dramaturgical" 
man. The fact that this individual has negated enough of 
his inner self to successfully handle the frustration of an 
overrational structure indicates that his humanity has been 
diminished; he is angry, neurotic, and very lonely. The more 
fiercely he clings to the rational structure for his life-
line of ideological security and identity, the more he 
111 
departs from the true generic social self. No conformity, 
compulsive behavior, or automotonic behavior is ever enough 
for the rational scheme. He is sapped of his humanity and 
vitality until his physical capacities give way to stress, 
disease, and, ultimately, death. 
Paradoxically, persons engaged in rationally imputed 
activity often do not perceive the genesis of their identity 
loss to be the very structure that promises life eternal, 
endless security; and, at the very least, a marble stone with 
their name on it when they are gone. Moreover, they believe 
the frustration of their self to be inadequacy or the inabil-
ity to cope. Psychologists reinforce such inadequate feel-
ings, dealing with symptoms while ignoring the genesis or 
pathology of the problem. Their identity also lies within 
the structure and its maintenance (Becker, 1973). 
Where reciprocity and meaningfulness at the generic so-
cial level cannot occur because of structural-situational 
impositions, the person is unable to fit, consider, change, and 
reconstruct new lines of action with others. The dynamic ex-
change becomes static; thus the person is isolated or in con-
flict and without social bonds. Self-concept and identity 
are also dependent on this reciprocity of action, because the 
social self takes form and becomes firm as a result of recip-
rocity of action with others in the process of socialization 
(Chapman, 1972). The institution of the political state 
based on this line of reasoning is destroying the social 
112 
institutions it was designed to cooperatively help survive 
by altering these structures away from social welfare to 
power directives. 
The institition of economy has as its survival function 
the production and distribution of goods and services (Young 
and Mack, 1959). As with the political state, the economic 
state has been elevated above the other survival institution 
concurrently with the political state. The characteristics 
of those persons under the imposition of the economic state 
are substantively the same as with all institutions overra-
tionalized for power and control. Indeed, it behooves man 
to earn a living through work and gather the fruits of labor. 
However, in a rational economic structure persons find accep-
table only those rewards that are objective, that is, external 
to them in terms of material. Self-esteem in this sense 
lies only in the increased number of "things" we surround 
ourselves with, not in the quality of such items. Movement 
out of the needs for survival into the wanting mode of mass 
production removes persons from the personal self to which-
ever self the exploiter has in mind. According to Veblen 
(1963), the emphasis on production and work for goods and 
services is left behind and an emphasis is placed on exploit-
ation and robbery of our fellow man. Within this elevated 
structure, there is no emphasis on "being" but on !!having." 
A person is defined by that which he/she owns. Ftomm (1976) 
describes this nature of having: 
The nature of the having mode of existence follows 
from the nature of private property. In this mode 
of existence all that matters is my acquisition of 
property and my unlimited right to keep what I have 
acquired. The having mode excludes others; it does 
not require any further effort on my part to keep 
my p:roperty or to make productive use of it .... 
In the having mode there is no alive relationship 
between me and what I have. It and I have become 
things, and I have it, because I have the force to 
make it mine. But there is also the reverse rela-
tionship: it has me, because my sense of identity, 
i.e., of sanity, rests upon my having it (and as many 
things as possible). The having mode of existence 
is not established by an alive, productive process 
between subject and object; it makes things of both 
object and subject. The relationship is one of 
deadness, not of aliveness (pp. 64-65). 
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The struggle for status, under the conditions imposed 
by an elevated economic state, moves man away from the generic 
social level; satisfaction is not found in the internal self 
but in the external inanimate material with which man sur-
rounds himself. Man is what he possesses--the car he drives, 
the clothes he wears, the house he makes payments on, the 
organizations to which he belongs. Where the object or 
machine-gadget world dominates the subject in a forced mode 
of production instead of an "alive production process," both 
subject and object become dead, particularly the subject at 
the generic social level. 
For the construction of reality to exist as a dynamic 
process between the individual and society, a balance must 
be sought between the major social institution so that no 
one ideology is elevated above any other. The political and 
economic institutions must be brought into more of a balance 
at the generic social level with the institutions of religion, 
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school, and the family. By so doing, the characteristics im-
posed on the individual would be maintained at a social level, 
one less dominated by any one elevated institution. If any 
institution elevates itself by use of ideology above any 
other institution, exploitation will occur. It is wrong to 
believe that the institutions of education, religion, or family 
should be elevated into a legal-rational order above the 
political or economic institutions. A balance must be main-
tained generically, socially, and reciprocally. An ideology 
that tears dual realities apart strikes at the very heart of 
social man and suppresses the self. 
The structural-situational imposition of polarized ra-
tional schemes causes estrangement and loneliness inthe indi-
vidual. The self, which a person must have for the purpose 
of identity, is negated. The following section attempts to 
characterize a person who is void of self-identity as a re-
sult of such impositions. 
Loss of Self-Identity by Structurally-
Situationally Imposed Loneliness 
A pattern of general characteristics emerge concerning 
lonely persons who have been dominated by a structural-situa-
tional scheme of overrationalization. In Figure 7 (page 79) 
antithetical constructs are presented to demonstrate the 
duality of reality, of the mind, and of selfhood. The charac-
teristics listed in the left-hand column represent the polar-
ized constructs imposed on the self to the denial or 
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"ignor-ance" of the diametric opposition of reality's other 
half. By imposing these characteristics with particular re-
wards and punishments to insure their acceptance, the lonely 
person under such domination will exhibit ideas, beliefs, and 
behaviors set into and characterized by general overrational-
ization. The structures rationally elevated have falsely 
become their social self in its entirety. Specifically, 
these persons exhibit a self-definition polarized in the fol-
lowing: 
1. Rationalism: belief in the logical mathematical, to 
the exclusion of irrational, aesthetic, religion (generically 
social), scientism,social Darwinism, man's obtainment of Utopia 
through the exercise of totality "rationality." 
2. Objectification: belief in the measurable, attribut-
ing a life and human qualities to the inanimate; worth and 
value are defined by the accumulation of the "objects" with 
which they surround themselves. 
3. Structural Rigidity: overconforming patterns of 
work/home affairs; rigid planning of work and leisure time; 
emphasis on form and appearance; casting images through con-
spicuous consumption; compulsively neurotic if "things" are 
not in their place; self-esteem and status are felt by con-
forming to organizational duty and responsibility even though 
unethical; emotionless conformity. 
4. External Locus of Control: the self is determined 
by external constraints, structural pressure; conformity in 
clothing, mannerisms, values transmitted through imputed media 
of television,advertising,rationalized indoctrination in 
school; rationalized churchism. 
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5. Predictability and Controllability: the self is val-
ued if always consistent and logical; such persons must al-
ways be in control of their situation to make it predictable; 
control of others is their insurance. 
6. Mechanistic: quality, a genuine interest in life, 
leisure, and work are substituted by the consumption of time 
and material efficiently; input and output of materials domi-
nate the quality of the material; number and quantity are of 
major concern. 
7. Objectively Judicial: strict adherence to policy, 
rules, regulations, and standards; flexibility rests with the 
person, never in the legal-rational; assumes consensus in law, 
therefore, law is seen as absolute; objective written law is 
dominant, not the social significance of the written law. 
8. Highly Ordered: bureaucratic structuring in every 
area of life including the family; the controller in the role 
of sadist; the controlled in the role of masochist; one-way 
power imputation from highest in rational "authority" to low-
est in "significance;" control of nature; environmental force 
into homogeneous material resources; man-made environmental 
instability. 
Loneliness occurs as the self feels something is "miss-
ing in life," polarized into the foregoing constructs, but is 
unable to identify the cause of the anxiety. The constructs 
that are imposing the polarization of self are the very 
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constructs the person believes or has been led to believe 
yield true identity of self. Consequently, for the structur-
ally-situationally imposed lonely person, the solution to the 
anxiety, the contradictions felt, is increased structural form, 
polarization, and order. Loneliness becomes self-perpetuated 
once it has been imposed by polarization. What emerges are 
two sets of factors which perpetuate loneliness: the precipi-
tating factor of polarization by structural-situational im-
position; and the maintenance factor of the inability of the 
self to identify the genesis of contradiction and so must 
cling to the polarized construct dependently for security. 
A discussion of these factors will be presented in Chapter 
v. 
Other-Imposed Loneliness 
The imposition of loneliness by others, as illustrated 
in Figure 11 (page 88), places loneliness, a lack of self-
identity, in a position with the same direction as the struc-
turally-situationally-imposed self we have previously de-
scribed. The justification for such a placement at the 
structural-situational pole lies in the observation that be-
cause so many persons are dominated by the structural con-
structs of overrationalization and the accompanying charac-
teristics, their impositions in the daily montage of social 
contacts tend to be not g~nerically social. Such 11 others 11 
impose their reality constructs upon persons believing them 
to be their own; but upon further consideration it seems 
that many of these constructs have only been transferred 
from the identity constructs of the polarized structural-
situational scheme. 
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What differentiates "other" impositions of self-identity 
from structural-situational impositions is the cognizance of 
the source. Persons who impose self-identity constructs in 
the rational, structural-situational scheme believe and act as 
if their identity was within overconformity. Persons who im-
pose self-identity constructs from the "other" mode perceive 
themselves as their "own person," their own decision maker, 
their own unique constructor of self. While outwardly demand-
ing they are "masters of their own identity," their values 
and behavior reveal them as an offspring of the polarized 
construct they do not perceive themselves to be. 
This imposition of the "others" on a person is not neces-
sarily the imposing of rational values per se as in the struc-
tural, but an insistence on conformity to their particular 
reality construct. For example, if other persons through 
peer pressure, chiding, and humiliation impose the behavior of 
drinking on a person who does not share the same value, the 
person has a choice of fleeing and disaffiliation, engaging 
in the "acceptable behavior" as defined by "others," or re-
maining with others suffering self-isolation within their 
own minds because they did not engage in drinking. What 
emerges is the power relationship issuing control by imposi-
tion not within a legal-rational structure, but by a person 
or persons who demand imposing conformity to the group value. 
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The characteristics of the static and asocial power relation-
ships are the same, except we have moved from the general 
power imposition of legal-rational structures to the particu-
lar power impositions of the group or another person. The 
static nature of power relations has not changed. What has 
changed are the particular values, beliefs, or behaviors that 
are imposed. Thus we may observe a counterculture, a group 
or person with values, beliefs, and behaviors vastly different 
from the structural legal-rational values, although the impos-
itions by power directives are carried out in the same man-
ner of persuasion, buying and selling, or coercion. 
While the imposition of "self identity" by others may 
be convincing or accepted they too have placed a ''curtain of 
fantasy" over the dualistic nature of reality to make their 
lives clear by "absolute" definitions (Ortega, 1957). The 
fantasy of "absolute" definitions, where a particular aspect 
of reality's dualism is elevated to a position of dominance, 
is the same for "others" imposing or the legal-rational im-
posing. The scope changes,the content (variation) changes, 
but the form (theme) remains. Kierkegaard (1849) describes 
the "immediate man" self as: 
. his self or he himself is a something inclun-
ed along with 'the other' in the compass of the 
temporal and the worldly. . . . Thus the self 
coheres immediately with 'the other,' wishing, 
desiring, enjoying, etc. but passively; ... he 
manages to imitate the other men, noting how they 
manage to live, and so he too lives after a sort. 
In Christendom, he too is a Christian, goes to 
church every Sunday, hears and understands the 
parson, yea, they understand one another; he dies; 
the parson introduces him into eternity for the 
price of $10--but a self he was not, and a self he 
did not become. . . . For the immediate man does 
not recognize himself,he recognizes himself only 
by his dress, ... he recognizes that he has a 
self only by externals (p. 184). 
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Such persons imagine they have an identity if they pay an in-
surance premium, they have control of life as they "gun" 
their sports car, work an electric toothbrush, or ride a 
motorcycle in a gang. 
According to Becker (1973), man has a desire to make his 
life "heroic." That is, to evolve his own uniqueness out of 
the apparent confusion externally. Self-esteem consists of a 
"hero's welcome" to our self. But the arrival at self is by 
the destruction of the shell covering the self and facing the 
anxiety in the terror of existence. Breaking the shell around 
the self is the realization that to live is to be lost. The 
more one clings to external imputations of self the more one 
is lost, for one becomes dependent on a definition other than 
his own concerning self. 
The lonely person who finds the imposition of "others" 
forcing order on his/her chaotic life by the imputation of 
power directives and not socially reciprocal ones faces a 
"dilemma of heroism" (Becker, 1973). The lonely choice of 
conforming to the power directive, where there is order and 
"other" acceptance, or to choose an alternative nonconform-
ity to the present imputation for some other reality con-
struct is a dilemma. 
Within the family though a parent or child may not im-
pose a legal-rational construct of reality on one another. 
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The imposition by power directives of any "absolute" reality 
construct upon the other or from others results in a dilemma 
of choice. A loneliness occurs in the self. The more power-
ful and pervasive the directive the more likely the person 
is to believe he/she must conform, especially if backed with 
negative sanctions for nonconformity. Again we see the lack 
of generic social reciprocity based on power which is neces-
sary for the self to find its identity. 
A "loving war" begins as the parent starts to allow a 
child more independence. With more independence to impose 
power directives, the child now begins to condemn and criti-
cize the parents. This is particularly true in adolescence. 
If a formidable amount of care is taken to maintain a generic 
social bond in early childhood where mutual input to social 
bonds are allowed, the move through adolescence is less prob-
lematic for the child as well as the parents. Instead of 
being "absolutely" dependent or independent, the self within 
each family member is aware of and free to bargain for self-
hood through interdependency. 
Within the schools and churches the imposition of "others" 
resulting in identity dilemmas may have little to do with 
values of the structural-situational setting. Instead there 
may be peer values that are counter to the structural situa-
tion. However, the means of imposing an absolute reality 
construct through power directives is precisely the same, 
namely, acceptance or rejection by the use of sanctions. To 
let the self exist as a duality is disallowed: "You are 
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either for me or against me." "Accept me for all I demand 
of you or reject me and everything I am." But the self with-
in its dilemma to find resolve or to exist dually wants to 
omit the word "or" from the absolute construct and insert 
the word "and." "I am for you and I am against you." Being 
fearful to be so contradictory, the person accepts or rejects 
another. The expression "you must love me or hate me" forces 
the self to choose a polarized construct. But is reality 
"love or hate"? Could not reality be love and hate? This 
author has observed that the persons one loves the most usu-
ally make one the angriest, and the persons one hates the 
most are usually the persons whose opinions we value more 
than others; otherwise we would not find them so intimidat-
ing. Such "and" constructs of reality are disallowed when 
reality is elevated to an "either/or" construct by absolute 
truth ideology. 
Within economic and political institutions the imposi-
tion by "others" may be aligned with the institution or dia-
metrically opposed to it. A polarization in either direc-
tion is deleterious to the social self (Figure 7). Both must 
exist for survival. 
Thus we understand the comparison and contrast of the 
structural-situational imposition on the self and that impos-
ed by others. The common denominator is the imposition of 
an absolute polarized reality construct from either extreme 
of dual reality to the negation of the other possible con-
structs. 
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What we must question is not so much the construction 
of reality but the polarization of the construct by eleva-
tion as total reality. Loneliness decreases in the instant 
that the duality of self is accepted by the individual and 
allowed to "be" by others. 
Self-Imposed Loneliness 
We have examined structural-situational and other impos-
itions of loneliness. The use of power directives and the 
imputation of a polarized construct of reality, as has been 
demonstrated,results in the loss of self-identity, alienation, 
and loneliness. Let us now examine the person who imposes 
loneliness upon him/herself; a better term may be aloneness. 
It must be remembered that physical isolation from others 
and the structure of institutions may not be lonely at all, 
but a chance to give the self's duality a time to exist un-
hampered by power directives and polar reality constructs. 
Many assume that a lack of contact with other persons, 
definitionally, is loneliness (Gordon, 1976). This is parti-
cularly true in some theories about the aged (i.e., disen-
gagement theory). However, a recent study (Rubenstein, 
Shaver, and Peplau, 1979) suggests that the elderly may be 
the least likely to be lonely. They may find more content-
ment with self because of the reduction of legal-rational 
imputation after they are retired. This too would vary 
based on the degree of acceptance of the polarized legal-
rational construct as the "total reality" during a process 
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of employment. Some of the elderly may feel emotionally and 
physically isolated, particularly if they accepted the work 
place, monetary rewards, and the structural arrangements of 
legal-rational systems as definitional of success and self 
es teem. Others may see retirement as an opportunity to "find 
themselves" once again. 
The persons who are alone and lonely may be in this posi-
tion because of structural and other impositions. They do 
not desire to be alone and lonely but have been externally 
battered into this condition. This would suggest loneliness 
by imposition of the two types already discussed. 
Self-imposed aloneness, without self-feelings of lone-
liness, becomes a positive experience for the person impos-
ing this condition upon him/herself. Earlier we discussed 
the "dilemma of heroism." -Aloneness can be seen as a reac-
tion to external impositions of selfhood. There are many 
examples in music, art, and literature that indicate the cre-
ator withdrew into physical isolation for self-reflection. 
The heroism involved in such behavior seems not one of exter-
nal definitions of self-esteem but one of internal self-
actualizing (Maslow, 1954). But the creative endeavor while 
in aloneness is usually produced for the esteem of others in 
the form of a book,work of art, or a selection of music as 
its final goal. That is, an "object" of approval or disap-
proval for others to judge, though approval may only come 
after the creator's death. 
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What differentiates self-imposed aloneness from loneli-
ness imposed by others and the structural-situational is the 
person's awareness of their unique existence. These individ-
uals have moved back to examine themselves and the external 
"selves" or roles they have been expected to play. What 
makes aloneness in this respect so positive to self-identity 
is not the outcome or productive object for others to grade 
and assess, but the creative process itself. In such moments 
of aloneness, self-reflection, and mental debate, the person 
becomes increasingly aware of him/herself as created by the 
environment and creator of that environment. There is self-
satisfaction and immeasurable freedom in such a notion. One-
self can "be" what one wishes oneself to "be." Such ideas 
are labeled by the structural-situational and others as de-
lusional, madness, and deviance. "Creativity of the self" is 
a nice expression for madness if one's definition of normal 
is polarized in legal-rational constructs which discourage 
creativity,new thought, and change. 
Such aloneness is not without problems. One may polar-
ize into any possible reality construct and decide it to be 
the whole of reality. For example, in the case of extreme 
subjectivism, impulsiveness, or other "contents" void of 
"form," Becker (1973) explains: 
The key to the creative type is that he is sepa-
rated out of the common pool of shared meanings. 
There is something in his life experience that 
makes him take the world as a problem; as a result 
he has to make personal sense out of it. 
Existence becomes a problem that needs an ideal 
answer; but when you no longer accept the collec-
tive solution to the problem of existence, then 
you must fashion your own. The work of art is, 
then, the ideal answer of the creative type to the 
problem of existence as he takes it in--not only 
the existence of the external world, but especial-
ly his own: who he is as a painfully separate per-
son with nothing shared to lean on. He has to an-
swer to his extreme individuation, his so painful 
isolation (p. 171). 
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The self-imposition of aloneness may have positive and 
negative consequences for the person who seeks to believe in 
his/her "own private religion." Depending on the intensity 
of the self-imposition and length of time, the person may be 
considered as an artist if definitions by "others" and the 
structural demands are approving of the object/product; or 
they may be considered mad if external impositions show dis-
approval. Sometimes it is difficult to define an action or 
object as the work of a genius or a madman. What defines it 
as good or bad is appraisal from others. This idea plagues 
physicians of institutions for the mentally ill; they have 
become keenly aware that some persons are institutionalized 
not because they could not live with society, but because 
society and more "normal" persons could not live with them. 
Extreme individuation in the mind and physical surround-
ings becomes as polarized as the polarized constructs imposed 
by "others" and the structural-situational. Though the ele-
vated construct may be different, the same dependency and 
acceptance of a polarized construct as "whole reality" occurs 
nonetheless. Drawing oneself away into physical isolation 
may help as a creative endeavor but may also deny others of 
one's presence for mutual interaction, particularly family 
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members and friends. This too denies the generic social bond, 
one of mutual interdependence and reciprocity, to exist. The 
dynamic duality of selfhood is denied by elevating a polar-
ized static construct of reality to the level of "total" real-
ity. 
Summary 
In each of our typologies of loneliness (structurally-
situationally-imposed, other-imposed, and self-imposed) the 
dominant feature is the polarization of a reality construct 
as "total" reality to the negation of other possible con-
structs. The dual self is negated when it is compelled to 
follow "either/or" constructs and not "both." Watts (1972) 
has called this the game of "Black-and-White." For loneli-
ness to decrease by allowing the dual self to think and be-
have, a realization must be made that: 
so-called opposites such as light and darkness, 
sound and silence, solid and space, on and off, 
inside and outside, appearing and disappearing, 
cause and effect, are poles or aspects of the 
same thing. But we have no word for the thing, 
save such vague concepts as Existence, Being, 
God, or the Ultimate Ground for Being (p. 30). 
As this author ponders the question of loneliness, what 
becomes apparent is that the more a person polarizes into 
"either/or" constructions of reality the farther selfhood, 
self-identity, self-dual ism are torn apart. Existence is frag-
mented. Ideally, the generic social self would be equally 
influenced by the structural-situational, others, and self 
(Figure 13). In describing the three categories of 
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Figure 14. Unequal Adherence by Imposition to Polar-
ized Constructs and the Placement of 
the Asocial Fragmented Self 
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impositions placed on the person or by the person, this author 
by design focused more heavily on the structural-situational 
impositions of the reality construct and loneliness than on 
the other two types. This was done because the impositions 
by structural-situational variables by society has changed, 
particularly in the past 100 to 200 years (Figure 14). 
Figure 14 represents more adequately the relationship between 
the three impositions of reality constructs than was present-
ed in Figure 11 (page 88). For generic dual selfhood and 
identity to be increased, and loneliness, alienation, and iso-
lation to be decreased, a balance in the middle of all possi-
ble reality constructions must be maintained. The notion is 
implied that reality is dynamic and relative, not static and 
absolute. The ideal positioning of persons should be allow-
ance for selfhood, self-identity, and the dualism of self. 
Represented is the ideal dual self in the center; the other 
models represent a shift to polar constructs, to the negation 
of part or all of the other possible reality constructs. The 
hollow circle represents the negated aspects of reality. 
Thus far we have traced society through change into the 
present reality construct ion imposed by legal - rat ion al schemes 
upon the self. It is not possible, by maintaining this path 
of reasoning, to construct a model for loneliness based on 
the move away from generic socially-derived constructs of 
reality to imposed polarized constructs of reality. 
Chapter V will discuss the loneliness model and the spe-
cific variables which determine its magnitude and intensity. 
CHAPTER V 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL OF LONELINESS 
Presented in Chapter IV was the case for loneliness as 
an imbalance of reality construction between structural-situa-
tional impositions, imposition of others, and imposition by 
the individual self. Because the "construction of reality" 
is an abstract term, it is not easily quantified or measured. 
Nonetheless, we can create categories of loneliness based on 
the imposition of reality constructs which are measurable, 
though the variables are not completely discrete and some 
overlap may occur. As shown in Figures 13 and 14, the vari-
ous constructs and dynamics between constructs can vary for 
each person, depending on the magnitude and intensity of the 
polarized imposition. 
Each dynamic position represented in Figure 14 can be 
given a numerical value shown below in Figure 15. The assign-
ment of numerical values to the possible reality constructs 
corresponds to the number of polarized positions negated by 
the elevation of one or more positions as "total" reality. 
Thus, if only the structural-situational is elevated while 
self and other impositions are negated, the value of -2 is 
representative of the distance from the center position, 
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person moves from the center (+3), the more imbalanced the 
self identity becomes. Polarization toward any of the three 
modes of reality construction increases the intensity of 
selflessness. 
Within such a model (Figure 15) there can be no one ab-
solute point to place a person, for each mental construction 
of reality may differ infinitely between rational-irrational, 
form-content, and structural-situational other-self imputa-
tions, just as there are perpetual shifts possible in self-
identity concepts. Nonetheless, as a general mode of reality 
construction and.polarization of the construction, the model 
can be considered representative. It is acknowledged that 
this model is symbolic and cannot totally depict reality. It 
is used only for descriptive purposes and not explanation. 
The person least likely to suffer from loneliness, alien-
ation, and selflessness (perhaps a better term is self-myopia) 
is the person who is able to balance dynamically inthe middle 
of the possible ranges of reality construction. Instead of 
considering only one particular facet of reality, such persons 
are able to understand the multi-faceted nature of reality 
construction. This does not indicate that any perspective 
of reality could be as equally right as it is wrong. This 
seems to be an insecure position to take concerning reality. 
It would be more secure to particularize to an absolute, ad-
hering to it adamantly. But there is a great deal of secur-
ity in understanding dynamic reality as opposed to control 
of and adherence to a static particular reality. The 
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reductionism involved in particularizing "total" reality 
brings not understanding but subjugation to the partial real-
ity construct and to others similarly subjugated (Chapman, 
19 71). As movement into "particular outlooks" occurs, free-
dom of inquiry, freedom of self, and freedom of selfhood are 
reduced to subjugation and control. As movement from the 
dynamic self-identity (Figure 15) occurs, part of the self 
is negated, which is "a psychosis that has advanced far in 
the present thought forms of the world" (Chapman, 1971). 
The interaction between imposition types of loneliness 
depicted in the model serves as a general description of pos-
sible modalities which produce the loss of self. More speci-
fically is the interaction within each polar type which af-
fects the length, magnitude, and intensity of the lonely self. 
Interaction Within Component 
Impositions of Loneliness 
Persons who have polarized in any direction away from 
the dynamic self-identity, because of imposition of the struc-
tural-situational, other, and self, may describe their exis-
tence as lonely, isolated, alienated, and anomic. But what are 
the variables or influences that maintain a person in a rigid 
construction of reality which make self-identity, acceptance, 
and selfhood difficult to grasp? Whether persons can move 
away from a polarized static construction of reality into a 
generically dynamic construction of reality is dependent on 
the person's ability to identify the following: 
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1. The locus of control or causality (internal and ex-
ternal). 
2. Stability or length of time one has been polarized 
into a static reality construct. 
3. Controllability--does the person perceive his/her 
self as having any control to affect change? 
4. The separation of the polar reality constructs that 
imposed loneliness and the reality constructs that are main-
taining the person in the polarized static reality. 
Locus of Control or Causality 
Persons who feel an imposition on the self--the struc-
tural-situational, other, or self by way of reaction to ex-
ternal constraints--may or may not be able to identify the 
genesis of the problem. For example, if the "organizational 
man" (Whyte, 1956) has been overwhelmed by the imposition of 
the structural-situational rationalism and bureaucratization, 
he may identify the loss of self. But he may strive to con-
form compulsively and increase the organization of his exis-
tence. He does not realize that as he increases his conform-
ity to the structural-situational reality construct, he is 
insuring the further polarization of his self. In striving 
for balance (dynamic self-identity) he moves into an imbal-
ance (static selflessness). Conversely, if a person recog-
nized the rationalism and bureaucratization of the structur-
al-situational impositions as the locus of control, he may 
soon realize that to maintain a balanced self he must offset 
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the influence of this static construction of reality with 
its polar opposite (i.e., spontaneity, aesthetics, art, music, 
and creativity) , thereby moving the construction of reality 
toward the middle dynamic position (Figure 15). 
The imposition of reality constructs that have been 
polarized by others and self are similarly identified. Per-
sons may ask, "I am lonely, out of touch with my self; is it 
because of my situation, because of others, or because I have 
chosen this myself?" Whichever of the three polar constructs 
has been elevated to dominance in the person's construction 
of reality must ~e offset by the missing influence of the 
other negated construct(s) in order to maintain the balanced 
dynamic self-identity. If the imposition by the structural-
situational, others, or self demands the person adhere to no 
other possible reality construction, the person then has rea-
son to be suspect of the truth or rightness of the construct. 
The identification of the locus of control is difficult. A 
slave strives to gain freedom; a master strives to insure 
slavery. Thus it is an onerous task for the lonely person 
to identify the genesis of the feelings of loneliness. Find-
ing one's self is a gloomy journey away from the security of 
a preconstructed polar reality in which one has been "pigeon-
holed." Even though a person realizes that "something inside 
is not right," the fear of traveling to selfhood, becoming 
dynamic, becoming form and content, becoming fluid in the 
movement from subject to object to subject is too alarming. 
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Those persons who identify the genesis of their self-
lessness as one of the three impositions (Figure 15) have a 
chance to reckon with and change the construction of their 
"selves." But even among these persons who identify the 
genesis of loneliness are those who prefer, as Watts (1970) 
terms it, "ignor"ance. Many of us have encountered individu-
als who are, by every external standard, "successful," "edu-
cated," and "well to do" but are "ignor"ant. Therefore, we 
see that even the identification of the locus of control or 
causality of selfless reality constructs does not insure the 
movement out of such constructs. 
Stability of Polar Construc-
tions of Reality 
Another important element in the dynamic of reality con-
structions, polarization, and loneliness (selflessness) is the 
stability or amount of time a person has been locked into a 
static polar reality construction. The longer the person re-
mains in the static construct, the more difficult it becomes 
for the person to free him/herself of its imposition. The 
dependency on the static construct is much the same as an 
addiction to anything. Slater (1978), in his book Wealth 
Addiction, has described the addiction to wealth as the same 
as any other addiction, even to the point of having withdraw-
al symptoms. 
The longer the person polarizes reality constructs, the 
more impossible it becomes to consider other possible 
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constructs. They have been too long negated. Thus the saint 
condemns the sinner; the bureaucrat condemns the bohemian; 
and the scientist condemns the artist. In group-out group 
relationships are based on the particular group's static con-
struct of reality; hence they attempt to elevate one con-
struct of reality above the others as "rightly more valid." 
The awareness that each construct of reality is as validly 
part of the whole reality as any other is forgotten. 
How particularized the person becomes in a myopic con-
struct of reality and the stability he/she is plagued with 
this myopia influences how far removed from the self, which 
is dual in nature, that the person has become. Loneliness 
will decrease when the person becomes aware of the multi-
reality construct of the whole reality. The stagnation in a 
particular reality construct with time becomes permanent, 
causing "social death" (Chapman, 1971). 
The identification of the selfless, lonely person must 
include as a dimension the length of time the person has been 
in a static reality-rut. How many persons in modern society 
find themselves in a rut and of those how many are lonely? 
The rut can only be avoided by continually changing as one 
engages in generically social interaction, allowing for 
generically social constructs of reality. 
Controllability of Selflessness 
Whether the person who experiences feelings of loneli-
ness (selflessness) continues to grasp the static constructs 
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that have negated the rest of the "self" is dependent on the 
person's perception of controllability. If the person be-
lieves his/her selflessness as imposed by the structural-
situational, others, and self is out of his/her control, he/ 
she will cling more desperately to the imposed construct, mov-
ing him/her farther away from the dynamic self-identity. 
What college professor has suggested a new idea opposed to 
the present society notions and has heard students remark, 
"It's an interesting idea, but it will never work; the world 
just isntt that way." This indicates that there exists a 
classroom of polar reality constructors. When asking the 
same students "How is the world?" tension shows on most of 
the faces. Though the students are "absolute" in saying 
"this is the way the world is," they are "unabsolute" and 
disagree when each tries to explain what "is" means. The 
same dilemma exists for any number of persons who have polar-
ized their reality constructs to the "ignor"ance and nega-
tion of any other construct, regardless of occupation. 
Conversely, persons may perceive their "selves" as hav-
ing control over the reality-ruts into which they have fall-
en. These persons are able to avoid the static reality ruts 
and move through many constructions of reality with relative 
ease. It requires courage to move out of the rigidly imposed 
reality constructs of the structural-situational, of others, 
and of self to examine the infinite range of reality con-
structs. It may cost a job, a car, or a house, but these 
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have no meaning if one obtains them and disallows the self 
to search for itself. 
For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the 
whole world, and lose his own soul [self] or what 
shall a man give in exchange for his soul [self] 
(King James Bible, Matthew 16, verse 26)? 
How well a person perceives his/her self as having con-
trol to effect change within his/her own existence will in-
crease or decrease the persistence of selflessness. This is 
indicated by persons who are lonely using words such as lost, 
out of control, desperate, frightened, without being able to 
identify the genesis of these feelings. It is the dual self 
within these persons in revolt, frustrated by the imposition 
of a single self construct as "the total self." The dual 
self responds with feelings of being hopelessly out of con-
trol. 
Precipitation and Maintenance 
of Loneliness 
We have discussed locus of control, stability, and con-
trollability of loneliness as a condition of selflessness to 
better understand the within interaction of the general model 
presented in Figure 15. These three dimensions are present 
as a person seeks to sort out the precipitating events, situa-
tions,or behaviors that affect loneliness as well as the 
events, situations, and behaviors that maintain loneliness. 
However, persons are able to do this only insofar as they 
identified the locus of control, that the duration of the 
140 
selflessness is not great, and that the move back toward the 
dynamic self-identity (Figure 15) is in their control. If 
the person is aware of these elements, understands the dual-
ity of the self, and reduces the imposition of precipitated 
and maintained aspects of loneliness, then a shift can be 
made to a multi-dimensional reality construct. For example, 
a person may identify a major event in the structural-situa-
tional, with others, or with self as the imposed precipitate 
of loneliness, but the resulting imbalance in reality con-
structs may cause the maintenance of attributes of withdraw-
al, hopelessness, feelings of emptiness, isolation, and aliena-
tion. To maintain or polarize into such attributes as a re-
action to the imposed reality constructs is to be dependent 
on static constructs which if perpetuated causes one to sink 
further into selflessness. 
Suggestions for Testing the Model 
We have described the interaction between and within the 
three categories of polar reality constructs, namely, the 
structural-situational impositions, impositions by others, and 
imposition by the self. For the dynamic social identity to 
exist generically, there must be a continual reciprocity be-
tween and within the structure, others, and the individual. 
Self-identity, selfhood, reduction of loneliness, and 
growth are dependent on maintaining this "luminous tension" 
(Horkheimer, 1936) with a continually balanced construction 
and reconstruction of generically social relationships. If 
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any of these polarized static constructions of reality are 
elevated by a rational scheme to dominance over any other 
"possible" reality construction, the self is separated into 
a fragmentary selfhood. Loneliness is the result. Selfless-
ness occurs if the self is not allowed to continually recon-
struct and construct anew aspects of reality in an infinite 
variety of patterns. When stagnated in a reality-rut by the 
imposition of one construction of reality as "whole reality," 
the self becomes selfless. 
As we seek to understand how we might test such a model 
of loneliness (selflessness) as a result of the imposition 
of static reality constructions, several approaches come to 
mind. One could take polar reality constructs such as de-
picted in Figure 9 (page 81) and ask persons to indicate what 
construct best represents most people. Essentially this is 
a semantic differential. By doing so a researcher could 
ascertain how polarized or dynamic persons view reality to 
be. Do persons see their world as irrational or rational, 
or do they understand the world to be both. Subsequently, 
the researcher could administer scales designed to measure 
social isolation, anomie, alienation, and the individual's per-
ception of loneliness relative to the five major social in-
stitutions. By comparing these scales to the semantic dif-
erential, one could test the hypothesis that the farther one 
has moved to polarized constructs of reality the more likely 
one is to feel loneliness (selflessness). We must assume 
that a test of semantic differences is indicative of mental 
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constructs (Whorf, 1952) in order to assure methodological 
validity. By the use of factor analysis and correlation, a 
researcher could study existing relationships between polar 
constructions of reality (absolutes) and loneliness, concur-
rently investigating dynamic constructions of reality (rela-
tive) and the presence of loneliness. Possible associations 
occur: 
1. As absolute constructions of reality increase, lone-
liness increases. 
2. As absolute constructions of reality increase, lone-
liness decreases. 
3. As absolute constructions of reality decrease (to 
relative constructs), loneliness increases. 
4. As absolute constructions of reality decrease (to 
relative constructs), loneliness decreases. 
Thus, we may test several hypotheses by the use of a quanti-
tative methodology. 
Another quantitative design might be to test for differ-
ences in loneliness based on social class measures (income, 
occupation, education) , comparing each social class measure 
to the semantic differential for indications of absolute or 
relative constructions of reality. It is again hypothesized 
that the more absolute one's construction of reality is in 
terms of static rigid constructs, the more the self is negat-
ed, selfless, and lonely. 
Within the area of qualitative methodology a researcher 
interviewing lonely persons could deternine what impositions 
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of structural-situational, of others, and of self are the 
most dominant features in their constructions of reality. 
Similarities are determined and the successful mean persons 
are utilized to decrease the impositions of the polar con-
struction of reality. By identifying the successful means 
by which persons return to the dynamic social identity, the 
researcher could observe whether the means consisted of the 
introduction of the opposite construct to offset the imposed 
construct. For example, if a person is highly ordered, struc-
tured, compulsive, and feels lonely, the successful means of re-
turning to the dynamic social identity may be the introduc-
tion of the diametrically opposed polar constructs of low 
order, structureless spontaneity through hobbies and crea-
tive endeavors. If feelings of selflessness decreased, the 
researcher could attribute loneliness to an elevated imposed 
construction of reality. 
Another qualitative method for testing the model con-
sists of observing persons in various situations and interac-
tions with others, employing the techniques involved in "the 
sociological imagination" (Mill, 1959). The researcher could 
gain subjective understanding as to whether or not the model 
applies to loneliness at a macro- and micro-sociological 
level, if the model increases understanding in the area of 
loneliness, and if the dynamics of reality constructions are 
descriptive of loneliness. The approach of the study has 
attempted to utilize this mode of description research ques-
tions to be asked by those who would test this model 
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qualitatively. The approach must then focus on the develop-
ment of the model, the consistency of the model with observa-
tion, and the feasibility of the model in prima facie. The 
model was designed to be dynamic and not rigid, for construc-
tion of a rigid model would negate the very ideas of self-
identi ty presented in this analysis. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The feelings of loneliness and the search for self-iden-
tity which man has sought to reconcile throughout history 
continue to be present in the present. If the discrepancy 
between man's ideal dynamic self-identity and the static im-
posed constructions of reality are too great, feelings of 
selflessness will dominate man's existence. 
Through the elevated rational schemes of social Darwin-
ism and evolutionary development to a planned Utopia, society 
has change~ continually negating the dual self. This nega-
tion is an effort to bring power, control, and dominance over 
individuals. Imposition of a rational scheme elevated into 
"total" reality negates the self of the infinitely changing 
construction of reality. To elevate a snap-shot photographic 
construction of reality as the only reality construct is to 
negate the dynamic moving picture of generic social interac-
tion. The self requires perpetual reciprocity with others 
and things to continue its movement as a dynamic social en-
tity. When movement and reciprocity are stifled by particu-
laristic reality constructs that are taken to be "total" 
reality, the aspects of the self which do not fit are dis-
missed as nonexistent. But the self is socially dynamic and 
is not fooled by the imposed constructions of reality from 
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the structural-situational, from others, and from the person. 
The self is fooled as it reacts with anxiety, fear, loneliness, 
and alienation, though it may not be able to precisely iden-
tify the genesis of those feelings. 
As long as one person imposes a static construction of 
reality for control over another person or group, the dynamic 
self will feel the contradiction between a power-directed 
reality construction and its dynamic construction of reality. 
It is this difference in the dual "self's" desired existence 
and the actual imposed existence that makes loneliness a con-
tinual problem. 
A discrepancy in a person's desired life and actual life 
is basic to the conflicts and social problems that exist. It 
is in this respect that loneliness is symptomatic of imposed 
reality constructs by a power structure, as is poverty, racism, 
and class conflict (Marx, 1867). The pervasiveness of lone-
liness is as socially problematic as any other aspect of 
society that grew in intensity with the social change of in-
dustrialization, bureaucratization, and secularization. If 
Sorokin (1941) was correct, society should begin to shift 
back toward the ideational, away from the now sensate forms 
of the static reality construction. If society and culture 
move in this direction, perhaps we can maintain the relative 
ideal between the polar extremes. Authors such as Fromm 
(1976), Reich (1970), and Watts (1966, 1968) believe the 
move is occurring presently toward a new consciousness. By 
depolarizing reality constructs we may experience a decline 
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in the number of persons with feelings of selflessness. The 
interrelationships of societies and ideologies are complex; 
but if compared to the human minds that have created them, 
they are simple. The self of man must be allowed to continue 
reciprocally in the infinite ways it constructs reality. If 
the self is not allowed to maintain its duality because of 
lesser imputed elevated constructions of reality imposed for 
power, the self and man will not survive. If the institu-
tions that were designed to insure survival rigidly impose a 
distorted reality on man, the institutions will be the cause 
of death and not.survival. When there are no socially dyna-
mic persons existing, the institutions will have destroyed 
themselves. 
For the self to find itself and maintain its duality, 
it must continually seek new paths of reality constructions 
which are out of the mainstream of the imposed constructions. 
The person in search of self must have the courage to wind 
down the "Road Not Taken" (Frost, 1916): 
Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth; 
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
And having perhaps the better claim, 
Because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
Though as for that the passing there 
Had worn them really about the same, 
And both that morning equally lay 
In leaves no step had trodden black. 
Oh, I kept the first for another day! 
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I--
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
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Loneliness and selflessness of a fragmented dual self 
by power impositions must be avoided or man will cease to 
exist. It is the responsibility of each individual to under-
stand and acknowledge the multiple constructions of reality 
in those they encounter so that the "happenings" of life may 
continue to be serious and humorous, saintly and sinful, mys-
tical and practical, and competitive and cooperative, with 
the "happening" of the self remaining alive and well. 
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